



News Brief Update 35

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Contact: Dr. Ian Davis
Email: idavis@natowatch.org
www.natowatch.org

Russia's war with Ukraine

Ukrainian officials this week were working to restore power nationwide after some of the heaviest bombardment of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure in the war to date. On 15 November, for example, Russia [launched](#) more than 90 missiles at Ukraine and sent in several drones, which hit several power plants, plunging parts of Kyiv and other cities into darkness. What seems to have been a Ukrainian air defence missile – fired during the Russian barrage on 15 November – landed in Poland, killing two people, and prompted [excited debate](#) about NATO invoking its Article 5 mutual defence clause (see below). Another [wave](#) of Russian rocket, drone and missile strikes across Ukraine took place on 17 November.

These ongoing Russian missile strikes have crippled almost half of Ukraine's energy system, the Ukrainian Government [said](#) on 18 November, and warned that Kyiv could face a "complete shutdown" of the power grid as winter sets in. About 10 million people were without power, President Zelensky said in a video [address](#) on 17 November. Authorities in some places had ordered forced emergency blackouts, he added. On 19 November he said that electricity supply problems were worst in and around Kyiv as well as in six other regions. "We are working throughout the country to stabilise the situation," he said in a video [address](#).

Fighting also [intensified](#) in the Donetsk region as Russian forces were reinforced by troops pulled from Kherson city, which Ukraine [recaptured](#) on 11 November (see [Update 34](#)). President Zelensky visited Kherson on 14

November and [said](#) the recapture of the city marked "the beginning of the end of the war". "We are moving forward. We are ready for peace, peace for all our country," he said. Zelensky also said in his evening video [address](#) that Russian troops had "destroyed absolutely all critical infrastructure" in Kherson. "There is no electricity, no communication, no internet, no television ... Russian occupiers destroyed absolutely all critical infrastructure for the people", he said. Ukrainian national energy company Ukrenergo [said](#) Russia also destroyed key energy infrastructure in the region. "The energy facility that provided power supply to the entire right bank of the Kherson region and a significant part of the Mykolaiv region, is practically destroyed," Ukrenergo chief Volodymyr Kudrytskyi said.

The Przewodów incident and NATO's Article 5

A missile that [crashed](#) in the south-eastern Polish village of Przewodów, killing two people on 15 November, was probably fired by Ukraine's air defences and not a Russian strike, Poland and NATO [concluded](#) on 16 November. Polish President Andrzej Duda said there is no evidence to suggest the missile was an intentional attack or was launched by Russia but was probably fired as part of Ukraine's air defences and "unfortunately fell on Polish territory". The US President Joe Biden also [said](#) the missile was unlikely to have been fired from Russia due to its trajectory. The incident is the first time that the territory of a NATO country has been struck during the near-nine-months of the war, and NATO ambassadors [met](#) in Brussels on 16 November to discuss the

incident. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg [said](#) while the investigation was ongoing into the incident, “there was no indication this was the result of a deliberate attack” and no indication it was a result of “offensive military actions against NATO”. He added, however, “Let me be clear: this is not Ukraine’s fault. Russia bears the ultimate responsibility as it continues its illegal war against Ukraine”.

Ukraine requested “immediate access” to the site of the explosion, and Ukrainian defence official Oleksiy Danilov [said](#) Ukraine wanted a “joint study” of the incident with its partners. Duda said both Poland and the United States would have to agree before Ukraine could take part in the investigation. The Russian Defence Ministry [said](#) that it had not targeted anywhere within 35km of the Ukraine-Poland border. The Ministry said statements about “Russian missiles” falling in Przewodów were “a deliberate provocation with the aim of escalating the situation”.

Although the missile turned out not to have been a Russian attack, for a few tense hours, the fear that the event would escalate into a direct conflict between NATO and Russia was very real. There was much speculation as to whether Poland would invoke Article 5 of the [1949 Washington Treaty](#) that created NATO. Invoking Article 5 is an alliance decision that has only been taken once before—after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. But even if it had been invoked, each country has the right to determine how it will respond. As Rajan Menon and Dan DePetris [wrote](#):

“...putting NATO on a war footing isn’t as simple as flipping a switch—and that’s a good thing. The invocation of Article 5 doesn’t actually require all NATO countries to go into autopilot mode and rush into battle. Each member of the alliance has self-agency. The decision to act, and what exactly to do, lies entirely with individual states and may differ depending on any number of circumstances—and for good reason”.

While Warsaw and its NATO allies largely responded by urging calm, the incident

underlined not only the war’s human costs but also its escalatory risks. (On the measured response that would have been appropriate even had it been a Russian missile, see [here](#)). In diplomatic retaliation, the Polish Foreign Ministry [announced](#) on 18 November that it would not grant a Russian delegation visas to attend an Organisation for Security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meeting in Lodz on 1-2 December.

Stalled diplomacy

A diplomatic shift in the war continues to seem unlikely with further mixed messages coming from the key players in recent weeks. It was reported in early November that the US administration was privately lobbying President Zelensky to repeal his [decree](#) banning negotiations with the present leadership in Russia. And following US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s visit to Kyiv on 8 November, Zelensky announced a new openness to diplomacy with Putin and [urged](#) the international community to “force Russia into real peace talks” (see [Update 34](#)). However, Zelensky set several [preconditions](#) that are likely non-starters for Moscow, including “the return of all of Ukraine’s occupied lands, compensation for damage caused by the war and the prosecution of war crimes”. He reiterated these preconditions on 15 November in [remarks](#) before the G20 in Bali, in which he issued a “10 point plan for peace”.

On 16 November, President Zelensky reportedly [said](#) he had “received signals” from Western officials that Russian President Vladimir Putin “wants direct negotiations”. Zelensky added that he “proposed a public forum because Russia is waging a public war”, though it remained unclear what such a forum would look like given that peace talks generally happen behind closed doors. For its part, the Kremlin [said](#) on 17 November that it could not imagine engaging in “public” negotiations with Ukraine. In a call with reporters, spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Kyiv of changing its position regarding possible Russia-Ukraine peace talks, adding that the war would continue regardless of dropping temperatures.

Finally, in [remarks](#) broadcast at the Halifax International Security Forum on 19 November, President Zelensky dismissed the idea of a “short truce” with Russia, saying it would only make things worse. “Russia is now looking for a short truce, a respite to regain strength,” the Ukrainian president said. “Someone may call this the war’s end, but such a respite will only worsen the situation”.

There have been some negotiations on key issues so far, such as the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, getting grain out of Ukraine and in organising prisoner swaps. Notably, a grain deal brokered by the UN and Turkey in July aimed at easing global food shortages was [extended](#) for four months on 17 November, although Russia said its own demands were yet to be fully addressed (see below). However, there have been no Ukrainian-Russian negotiations since March on the big issues. Meanwhile, on 14 November, US Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns [met with his Russian counterpart in Ankara, Turkey](#) to discuss Moscow’s nuclear threat in Ukraine (see below) and to raise the issue of US prisoners in Russian jails. This marked the highest-level public meeting between US and Russian officials since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

For options of what a possible settlement for Ukraine might look like, see Cambridge University’s [Ukraine Peace Settlement Project](#).

Global divisions on the war: UNGA, G20 and APEC meetings

The war in Ukraine has provoked a unanimous reaction against Russian aggression from the EU, the US and the West’s closest allies. In the rest of the world, however, the attitude has been different. Many countries in the Global South have acted according to their own interests, sought to maintain their autonomy, and not be drawn into a confrontation that they do not recognise as their own. This fracture between the West and Global South was evident in three high-level international meetings this week: in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the G20 and the Asia Pacific

Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. On 14 November, the UNGA [called](#) for Russia to make reparations to Ukraine and be held accountable for its conduct. However, only 94 (less than half of the assembly’s 193 members) voted to approve the resolution, that stated Russia “must bear the legal consequences of all of its internationally wrongful acts, including making reparation for the injury, including any damage, caused by such acts”. The resolution also recommended that member states, in cooperation with Ukraine, create an international register to record evidence and claims against Russia. Fourteen countries voted against the resolution, including Russia, China and Iran, while 73 abstained, including Brazil, India and South Africa. Not all member states voted.

The G20 leaders met in Bali, Indonesia, on 15-16 November 2022. A G20 [Leaders’ Declaration](#) said “most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine”, and demanded Russia’s “complete and unconditional withdrawal” from its neighbour’s territory. The reference to war is a rejection of Russia’s claim that it is involved in a “special military operation”. But it also said “there were other views and different assessments of the situation and sanctions”, [reflecting](#) the divisions among G20 states over Russia. UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak [called](#) Russia a “pariah state” on the eve of the G20 meeting, where he vowed to confront Moscow’s representative, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in public and on the sidelines of the summit. Lavrov was attending in [President Putin’s absence](#).

Finally, at the APEC summit meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, on 18 November some of the 21 member states members [condemned](#) the war in Ukraine and also pledged to keep supply chains and markets open. “There were other views and different assessments of the situation and sanctions,” their joint [statement](#) read, adding that APEC was not the forum to resolve security issues.

Military and financial assistance to Ukraine and Russia

Ukraine continues to rely heavily on international military and financial support from Western states. Most of the military assistance has come in the form of bilateral arms transfers, training and other support, which is being coordinated by the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which meets on an ad hoc basis and involves Ministers of Defence and senior military officials from Western-aligned states from around the world. The most recent meeting took [place](#) on 16 November. External military support to Russia so far has been limited to a handful of states, principally [Iran](#) and [North Korea](#).

The White House [requested](#) an additional \$37.7 billion in aid for Ukraine on 15 November, with more than half of the aid going toward arms transfers and restocking US weapons stockpiles. If fulfilled, the request would more than double the \$18 billion in [security aid](#) that Washington has provided to Kyiv since Russia's invasion in February. (Other estimates suggest that the United States has [pledged](#) about \$25 billion in military aid to Ukraine—more than four times Ukraine's 2021 defence budget). In addition to supplying weapons to Ukraine, the United States is pushing forward with a new joint forces command, to be stationed in Germany, to "handle weapons shipments and personnel training". The new command, which was previously [reported](#) in August, will be officially called the Security Assistance Group Ukraine (SAGU), and will be based out of US Army Europe and Africa headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany. The [command](#) will involve 300 US military personnel but in addition, "the thousands of US soldiers now positioned at training areas in Poland and Romania ... could factor into the plans", it was [reported](#) in September.

In addition, NATO agreed at its June [Madrid Summit](#) to strengthen a 2016 [Comprehensive Assistance Package](#) for Ukraine. The additional elements to the package include both short-term assistance (ranging from fuel, protective equipment to portable anti-drone systems and

secure communications) and longer-term support (to help modernize the Ukrainian armed forces to NATO interoperability standards and strengthen its defence and security institutions).

America's partners in Europe and beyond have [pledged](#) an additional \$12 billion in support to Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. The EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said recently that the EU and its member states have so far [provided](#) weapons and military equipment worth a total of at least €8 billion to Ukraine. The UK has so far pledged about £3.25 billion worth of military aid, and during a visit to Kyiv on 19 November UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak [announced](#) that Britain will provide a £50m air defence package for Ukraine, including anti-aircraft guns and technology to counter Iranian-supplied drones. After a meeting on 14 November in the Hague with Dutch Foreign Minister, Wopke Hoekstra and Dutch Defence Minister, Kajsa Ollongren, to discuss the alliance's ongoing support to Ukraine, the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg [welcomed](#) a €120 million contribution from the Netherlands to support Ukraine. Hoekstra also announced €20 million in funding for NATO's assistance fund for Ukraine, while another €25 million is to go towards combat food rations, first aid, ambulances, fuel trucks and drone jammers, Ollongren added. Finally, Cambodia and Japan have [agreed](#) to help Ukraine with mine clearing. Training will be provided by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, a government-backed aid agency.

For further details on arms transfers to Ukraine, see, the [Forum on the Arms Trade](#). And for a timeline of every US arms shipment to Ukraine that has been announced since the war began, see [here](#).

Humanitarian consequences of the war

Exact figures for the number of war fatalities, both military and civilian, are difficult to verify and confirm. [Undercounting and manipulation](#) of the data is common in war. America's

most senior general and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, [estimates](#) that Russia's military had seen more than 100,000 of its soldiers killed and wounded in Ukraine, adding Kyiv's armed forces have "probably" suffered a similar level of casualties in the war. These remarks offer the highest US estimate of casualties to date in the nearly nine-month-old conflict. Milley also suggested that around 40,000 civilians had died after being caught up in the conflict. In September Russia [acknowledged](#) nearly 6,000 war dead, while Ukraine [claims](#) to have killed more than 84,000 Russian soldiers in the war to date. Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed forces, [said](#) on 22 August at a public forum that nearly 9,000 Ukrainian military personnel have been killed in the war. This was the first time Ukraine has revealed the scale of its military losses since the war began, previously protected as a tightly guarded secret - although in early June, a senior Ukrainian presidential aide [told](#) BBC News 100-200 Ukrainian soldiers were dying in the Donbas region every day. In April, Russia [said](#) it had killed about 23,000 Ukrainian troops.

According to [data](#) collected by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as at 14 November, 6,557 civilians have died since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, including 408 children. Ukraine's prosecutor general's office [said](#) on 19 November at least 437 Ukrainian children have been killed and more than 837 injured as a result of Russia's invasion. The actual civilian casualty figures are likely to be considerably higher, as the receipt of information from some locations where intense hostilities have been going on has been delayed and many reports are still pending corroboration. According to [Action on Armed Violence](#) (AOAV) the number of civilian casualties from explosive violence in the Ukrainian conflict reached 9,113 people by 16 November. From this number, 3,374 were killed and 5,739 were injured. Ninety-five per cent (8,625) of civilian casualties have occurred in populated areas.

As of 15 November, there were 7,841,359 [refugees](#) from Ukraine recorded across Europe, 4,725,612 of whom were registered

for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe. This gives them the right to live and work in any EU country and benefit from housing and schooling assistance.

Flight MH17 court decision

On 17 November a Dutch court [found](#) three men guilty of the murder of 298 people on board flight MH17, which was shot down by a Russian surface-to-air missile when it was flying over eastern Ukraine in 2014. Russia criticised the Dutch court's decision to convict two former Russian intelligence agents and a Ukrainian separatist leader. The Dutch Government [said](#) on 18 November that it will summon the Russian ambassador in the Netherlands over Russia's response to the verdict in the trial.

Further reading:

On outcomes and consequences of the war

Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom, [How more neutral states can mediate peace talks in Ukraine](#), Responsible Statecraft, 19 November 2022

[NATO PA President, Head of Spanish delegation: supporting Ukraine is defending democratic values](#), NATO PA News Release, 19 November 2022

Branko Marcetic, [NATO expansion and the origins of Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#), Responsible Statecraft, 18 November 2022

James Landale, [Ukraine war: Poland missile strike reveals Nato divisions](#), BBC News, 17 November 2022

[NATO faces new challenge as Ukraine war spills into Poland](#), Al Jazeera, 17 November 2022

Solon Solomon, [Can Oblique Intent Trigger an Armed Attack and Activate Article 5 of NATO?](#), Lawfare, 17 November 2022

["No indication" missile that hit Poland was "attack," but NATO says Russia at fault as it hammers Ukraine](#), CBS News, 17 November 2022

Rajan Menon and Dan DePetris, [Deep breaths: Article 5 will never be a flip switch for war](#), Responsible Statecraft, 17 November 2022

[SHAPE hosts future Ukrainian military leaders](#), NATO News Release, 17 November 2022

John Feffer, [No Time for a Ceasefire in Ukraine](#), Foreign Policy in Focus, 16 November 2022

Alexander Baunov, [A Missile Falls on NATO Territory. What Next?](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 November 2022

[NATO sees no Russia threat amid Poland blast investigation](#), Associated Press, 16 November 2022

[NATO Secretary General takes part in Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting](#), NATO News Release, 16 November 2022

Sarang Shidore, [G20 hits sweet spot as all sides give ground and 'show maturity'](#), Responsible Statecraft, 16 November 2022

[NATO Allies address the explosion in the east of Poland](#), NATO News Release, 16 November 2022

Connor Echols, [How a lightly-sourced AP story almost set off World War III](#), Responsible Statecraft, 16 November 2022

[Press conference](#) by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Poland, 16 November 2022

Scott R. Anderson and Benjamin Wittes, [What If the Przewodów Tragedy Had Been Caused by a Russian Missile?](#) Lawfare, 16 November 2022

[Poland likely to invoke NATO's Article 4, will raise missile blast with UN – officials](#), Reuters, 16 November 2022

[Biden: 'Unlikely' missile that hit Poland fired from Russia](#), Associated Press, 16 November 2022

[Explainer: NATO's Articles 4 and 5: Could Ukraine war trigger its defence obligations?](#) Reuters, 16 November 2022

John Deni, [Could Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast](#), The Conversation, 16 November 2022

Peter Pascucci and Kurt Sanger, [Cyber Norms in the Context of Armed Conflict](#), Lawfare, 16 November 2022

Jon Wolfsthal, [Keep Your Eyes on the Prize: Ukraine is winning so don't let Putin distract from that reality](#), blog, 16 November 2022

Jez Littlewood and Filippa Lentzos, [Russia \(again\) peddles its debunked US-Ukrainian bioweapons claims at the United Nations](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 15 November 2022

Connor Echols, [Biden wants \\$37B more for Ukraine, setting up lame-duck fight](#), Responsible Statecraft, 15 November 2022

Pascal Lottaz, [Evolving but not disappearing: Neutrality after the Cold War](#), ELN Commentary, 15 November 2022

Ted Snider, [Is Ukraine dropping talk of an accelerated NATO bid?](#), Responsible Statecraft, 15 November 2022

Julian Borger, [Poland explosion unlikely to spark escalation – but risks of Nato-Russia clash are real](#), The Guardian, 15 November 2022

[NATO's Stoltenberg warns against underestimating of Russia](#), Reuters, 14 November 2022

[Secretary General welcomes Dutch contributions to NATO security and Ukraine](#), NATO News, 14 November 2022

[NATO Military Staff welcomes Ukrainian cadets](#), NATO News Release, 14 November 2022

[Zelenskiy Says Kherson Critical Infrastructure Destroyed Intentionally By Withdrawing Russian Forces](#), RFE/RL, 14 November 2022

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, [US quietly announces new Ukraine command with 3-star general](#), Responsible Statecraft, 14 November 2022

[After Kherson city win, Ukraine faces 'difficult months': NATO](#), Al Jazeera, 14 November 2022

[Hope for G-20 consensus dwindles as Russia bristles at 'unacceptable language' regarding Ukraine invasion](#), Fortune, 13 November 2022

Rajan Menon, [Fighting a War on the Wrong Planet - What Climate Change Should Have Taught Us](#), TomDispatch, 13 November 2022

Manucharian Grigoriy, [EU vs RT: A Propaganda Chess Match for the Ages](#), Geopolitical Monitor, 10 November 2022

Dan Drollette Jr, ["It's a different kind of world we're living in now"—Interview with political scientist Francis Fukuyama](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 November 2022

On the risk of nuclear war

There have been growing concerns for several weeks that the war in Ukraine might be approaching “a moment of [maximum danger](#)”. In particular, there are worries that a cornered, desperate Vladimir Putin may resort to nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. In talks on 14 November US President Joe Biden, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, reiterated their agreement that a nuclear war “should never be fought”, the White House said in a [statement](#). However, [Beijing’s readout](#) from the long-awaited meeting in Bali differed slightly and did not mention the pair agreeing on opposing Russia’s threat of using nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war—although the previous day, Chinese premier Li Keqiang [emphasised](#) the “irresponsibility” of nuclear threats, suggesting China was uncomfortable with Russia’s nuclear rhetoric, a senior US official said. President Zelensky welcomed these statements from the US and China. “This is a grouping of very weighty states. And today, on the eve of the summit, weighty statements have already been made,” he said in his video [address](#) on 14 November. “In particular, it is important that the United States and China jointly highlighted that the threats of using nuclear weapons were unacceptable. Everyone understands to whom these words are addressed”.

Meanwhile, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan [said](#) he believed neither Russia nor the US planned to use nuclear weapons. Erdoğan’s comments came after US CIA Director William Burns and Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence service, [met](#) in Ankara in what was the first known high-level, face-to-face US-Russian contact since the war began in February.

Victor Gilinsky, [What the new posture review says—and does not say—about the future of nuclear weapons](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 14 November 2022

Jon Wolfsthal, [What’s Logic Got to Do with Anything? Putin can be rational AND go nuclear](#), Blog, 14 November 2022

Shannon Bugos, [Despite challenges, US-Russian nuclear arms control has its benefits](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 November 2022

Charles B. Strozier and David M. Terman, [Putin’s psychology and nuclear weapons: the fundamentalist mindset](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 November 2022

On the Ukraine war and COP27

The Russian war in Ukraine has intensified calls to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. A prominent Ukrainian climate activist and environmental lawyer, Svitlana Romanko, was suspended from the UN climate talks after she and others [disrupted](#) a Russian side event inside COP27. During the event, Svitlana Romanko and others accused Russia of committing war crimes in Ukraine. In a video [address](#) at the [COP27](#) UN climate summit in Egypt on 8 November, President Zelensky told world leaders they will not be able to tackle the climate crisis unless Russia’s invasion of his country ends. “There can be no effective climate policy without the peace,” he said. According to [analysis](#) by the Climate Action Tracker (an independent research consortium that has been tracking climate action since 2009), the global dash for gas amid the Ukraine war will accelerate climate breakdown and could send temperatures soaring far beyond the 1.5C limit of safety. If all of the new gas projects announced in response to the global gas supply crunch are fulfilled, the resulting greenhouse gas emissions would add up to about 10% of the total amount of carbon dioxide that can safely be emitted by 2050.

[“Fossil Fuels Fund Dictatorships”: Ukrainian Climate Activist Suspended from COP27 over Russia Protest](#), Democracy Now, 18 November 2022

[Exiled Russian Environmentalist: Russia’s Uranium Sales to U.S. & Europe Help Putin Fund Ukraine War](#), Democracy Now, 18 November 2022

[Ukrainian Climate Scientist Says Fossil Fuels Enabled Russian War in Ukraine](#), Democracy Now, 18 November 2022

Rajan Menon, [How Russia's war busted the myth of universality](#), Responsible Statecraft, 15 November 2022

On investigations of war crimes in Ukraine

President Zelensky [accused](#) Russian soldiers of war crimes and killing civilians in Kherson. "Investigators have already documented more than 400 Russian war crimes. Bodies of dead civilians and servicemen have been found. The Russian army left behind the same savagery it did in other regions of the country it entered," he said on 13 November. Investigators in recaptured territory in the Kherson area [uncovered](#) 63 bodies bearing signs of torture after Russian forces left, Ukraine's interior minister said on 18 November. Details also emerged of an alleged "[torture room](#)" in Kherson city where dozens of men were allegedly detained, electrocuted, beaten and some of them killed. Police said Russian soldiers took over the juvenile detention centre in around mid-March and turned it into a prison for men who refused to collaborate with them or who were accused of partisan activity. Russia denies its troops target civilians or have committed atrocities. However, mass burial sites have been found in other parts previously occupied by Russian troops, including some with civilian bodies showing signs of torture.

According to the Conflict Observatory, a Yale University group researching war crimes, hundreds of Ukrainians were detained and abducted in Kherson after Russia seized the province, in evidence of a planned campaign. In a [report](#) published on 18 November, the Observatory documented 226 extrajudicial detentions and forced disappearances in Kherson. About a quarter of that number were allegedly subjected to torture and four died in custody. Meanwhile, Russia [accused](#) Ukrainian soldiers of executing more than 10 Russian prisoners of war following the circulation of a video on social media purporting to be from the frontline. The footage appears to show Russian soldiers emerging from an outbuilding in the grounds of a house with their hands above their heads before they are told to lie face down. One of the men, as he emerges

from the building, appears to turn his gun on Ukrainian soldiers. The footage suggests all the Russians were killed in the violence that followed.

International fact-finding missions and investigations have identified clear patterns of violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Ukraine since the Russian invasion in February 2022. The violations are wide-ranging, including the conduct of fighting as well as treatment of prisoners of war, forced abductions, torture, restriction of civil and human rights, and denial of essential services. The United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Ukrainian national courts have all been active in attempting to hold criminals accountable.

The ICC, for example, opened an [investigation](#) into possible war crimes in Ukraine just days after Moscow's forces invaded and it dispatched dozens of investigators to the country to gather evidence. A substantial ICC investigative team [appears](#) to be working in Ukraine on a near permanent basis. Similarly, within the OSCE the Moscow Mechanism was activated to establish two expert missions to investigate violations and abuses committed in the war (see the subsequent [April](#) and [June](#) reports). On 14 July, 45 countries [agreed](#) at a conference in the Hague to coordinate investigations into suspected war crimes in Ukraine. Finally, in October, a [report](#) published by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found reasonable grounds to conclude that an array of war crimes, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine. Russian armed forces are responsible for the vast majority of the violations identified.

On sanctions against Russia and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine

Russia's invasion of Ukraine galvanized the US, UK and EU, and a handful of other Western-aligned countries, to unleash a series of

[sanctions](#) meant to punish Vladimir Putin's government and pressure him to pull his forces back. While the sanctions lists are sometimes difficult to interpret, the EU has [sanctioned](#) 1,236 individuals and 115 entities—an approximate doubling of its entire sanctions portfolio across the dozens of sanctions regimes it implements; the UK Government has [frozen](#) more than £18bn of assets belonging to oligarchs and other Russians and UK [sanctions](#) have been imposed on 1,271 people according to [the annual review](#) of the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), published on 10 November;; and the US has [sanctioned](#) more than 1,000 individuals or organizations since the invasion. The numbers, and the pace of the rollout, dwarf the sanctions lists for the likes of Iran, North Korea, Libya, the thematic counterterrorism lists, and all others. However, rather than dissuading the Kremlin as intended, the penalties appear instead to be exacerbating inflation, worsening food insecurity and punishing ordinary Russians more than Putin or his allies. Moreover, Russia has claimed (see NATO Watch [Update 17](#) and [Update 18](#)) that it is getting more revenue from its fossil fuel sales now than before its invasion of Ukraine, despite (or partly because of) Western sanctions.

US Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, [said](#) some sanctions on Russia could remain in place even after any peace agreement with Ukraine, the Wall Street Journal reported on 13 November. Yellen said that any eventual peace agreement would involve a review of the penalties the US and its allies have imposed on Russia's economy, according to the Journal. "I suppose in the context of some peace agreement, adjustment of sanctions is possible and could be appropriate," Yellen said in an interview in at the G20 summit.

Brooke Harrington, [Sanctioning Russia's oligarchs—with shame](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 November 2022

On international food security and Ukrainian grain exports

A deal to allow vital grain exports to continue from Ukraine's southern Black Sea ports was

extended on 17 November for another four months, calming worries over the world's food supply. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres [said](#) that the deal would continue for 120 days with Kyiv and Moscow's approval. It was due to expire on 19 November. Rebeca Grynspan, a senior UN trade official, [called](#) the initiative a "beacon of hope" and said it was "proof of what leadership [and] multilateralism can achieve, even in the midst of war". Guterres [echoed](#) Grynspan's comments, noting that the deal "demonstrates the importance of discreet diplomacy in finding multilateral solutions". The next day, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan [talked](#) with President Zelensky and they congratulated each other for reaching agreement on the extension, Erdoğan's office said. Erdoğan told Zelensky the "extension of this understanding to the negotiation table" would benefit all parties.

The [grain deal](#) between Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the UN was agreed on 22 July and is considered to be crucial for Ukraine's economy as well as global food security (on international food security and Ukrainian grain exports, see NATO Watch [Update 17](#), [Update 18](#), [Update 20](#) and [Update 21](#)). The grain exports are being overseen by a [Joint Coordination Centre](#) (JCC) in Istanbul where Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN personnel are working. It had allowed Ukraine to transport more than 9 million tonnes of grain and oilseed commodities, while Russia was allowed to export food and fertiliser, [helping to bring down food prices](#) by 15% from their March peak after the war made the route treacherous.

Connor Echols, [Diplomacy Watch: Grain deal extended as Putin signals interest in peace talks](#), Responsible Statecraft, 18 November 2022

On energy security in Europe

Europe is striving to diversify its energy supply sources in order to curb its dependence on Russia. Gas shortages are occurring across Europe, raising the prospect of energy rationing as governments push to develop alternative supplies. The West accuses Russia of restricting energy supplies to boost prices in retaliation for sanctions imposed after

Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. Russia denies it is to blame, and instead attributes responsibility to Western sanctions and various technical problems. President Putin has also [threatened](#) to cut off all deliveries of gas, oil, and coal to Europe if they imposed a price cap on Russian energy imports. President Putin [discussed](#) creating a Turkish “gas hub” with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during a telephone discussion on 18 November.

On developments within Russia

A member of Russia’s armed forces who took part in the invasion of Ukraine has requested political asylum after landing in Madrid, according to [reports](#).

[Russian soldier seeking asylum in Madrid denounces ‘criminal’ Ukraine war](#), The Guardian, 17 November 2022

Janis Kluge, [Russia’s economy is much more than a “big gas station.” Under sanctions, that’s now its biggest problem](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 November 2022

On developments within NATO

Russia military transfers to Turkey

According to a [report](#) by Nordic Monitor, Russia plans to install radar and missile systems in a Turkish town located some 280 miles from a critical NATO radar base as part of an agreement to build a 4,500-MW capacity nuclear power plant in Turkey. Opposition groups in Turkey raised security concerns: “The installation of a radar system also means the establishment of an air defence system. In other words, have you given permission for the construction of a nuclear power plant that we can’t protect ourselves? How and on what basis will the software for this system, which will be left entirely to the Russians, distinguish between friend and foe?” asked opposition parliamentarian Zeki Hakan Sıdali during a debate in the Turkish parliament on 26 October. Sıdali represents Mersin province, where Russia’s Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in the town of Akkuyu, near Buyukeceli in the Gulnar district. The agreement was originally signed as an

intergovernmental deal between the two countries in May 2010.

Hungary and Romania join NATO ammunition stockpile programme

Hungary and Romania have [joined](#) the Multinational Ammunition Warehousing Initiative (MAWI), which allows Allies to manage ammunition stockpiles effectively and collectively. In the margins of the autumn meeting of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (NADs)—NATO’s primary forum for cooperation on delivering interoperable military capabilities—at NATO HQ on 16 November, the current participants of the MAWI (Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency) welcomed Hungary and Romania to this Initiative, which aims to improve the way NATO allies and partners store and distribute ammunition stockpiles. During two days of discussions, the NADs [discussed](#) bolstering allied capabilities, inventories and stockpiles, preferably through multinational cooperation. Participants focussed on ways to ramp up production of key capabilities, address supply chain issues, and increase the interoperability of allied systems. The governance of major armaments programmes, innovation and standardisation also featured heavily in the talks, which were also attended by representatives from experts from the EU to ensure coherence between respective initiatives.

Resilience discussions

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the first [meeting](#) of senior officials responsible for resilience at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 16 November 2022. The insights and guidance on enhancing national and collective resilience will help inform the definition of resilience objectives for the alliance, which will be presented to NATO leaders at the Vilnius Summit in July 2023. Since 2016 NATO has accelerated this work, establishing baseline requirements for allies to evaluate national resilience in key areas, including the continuity of government services, communications, transport, food, water and energy supplies, and dealing with

mass casualties and the uncontrolled movement of people. In 2021, NATO agreed a strengthened resilience commitment and, as part of the NATO 2030 agenda, to designate a senior official to coordinate national resilience efforts and enhance consultations within NATO. At their first meeting in Brussels they agreed to develop a resilience roadmap to the 2023 Vilnius Summit to ensure tangible and timely progress.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

At the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's [Annual Session](#) in Madrid (18-21 November 2022), NATO and partner countries were [urged](#) to keep up defence spending in a more complex security environment involving state on state warfare but also challenges like terrorism, energy sabotage and cyberattacks.

[Five NATO aircraft carriers hold drills in major naval deployment](#), NATO News Release, 19 November 2022

[Russian Aircraft Conduct Unsafe, Unprofessional Overflight of NATO Ships in Baltic Sea](#), NATO News Release, 18 November 2022

[Halifax to host new NATO operation to pursue next-level defence technology](#), CBC News, 18 November 2022

[5 NATO carrier strike groups, including the US Navy's newest supercarrier, are patrolling waters around Europe](#), Business Insider, 18 November 2022

[Top NATO procurement officials discuss bolstering stockpiles](#), NATO News Release, 17 November 2022

[More Allies join NATO's Multinational Ammunition Warehousing Initiative](#), NATO News Release, 17 November 2022

[NATO Secretary General addresses first meeting of senior Allied resilience officials](#), NATO News Release, 16 November 2022

Jacob Gronholt-pedersen and Gwladys Fouche, [NATO allies wake up to Russian supremacy in the Arctic](#), Reuters, 16 November 2022

[NATO Secretary General discusses Ukraine, military mobility with EU defence ministers](#), NATO News Release, 15 November 2022

[NATO strengthens political dialogue with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), NATO News Release, 14 November 2022

[Russia to install radar and missile systems close to critical NATO facilities in Turkey, prompting security concerns](#), Nordic Monitor, 14 November 2022

[Top Russian diplomat claims US, NATO trying to take control of Asia-Pacific region](#), Anadolu Agency, 13 November 2022

[Russian State TV Host Says Kherson Retreat May Be Trap To Lure NATO Troops](#), Newsweek, 13 November 2022

[Summit prepares ground for 'NATOisation of Europe' and continues collision course with China and high levels of military spending](#), NATO Watch Briefing No.96, 6 July 2022

On Finland and Sweden joining NATO

Finland and Sweden were invited to join NATO, after a [trilateral memorandum](#) with Turkey agreed on the eve of the NATO Madrid Summit assuaged Ankara's previous objections. The two Nordic countries will become NATO members after the Accession Protocol is ratified by all 30 member states. The invitation to Finland and Sweden represents a major geopolitical shift in Europe as the two countries move away from neutrality. Symbolic of this shift, a planned barbed-wired fence along Finland's long border with Russia will begin construction early next year, Finnish border guard officials [said](#) on 18 November.

To date, 28 NATO member states have ratified the decision. Hungary and Turkey are the two member states where parliaments have not yet been asked to vote on the issue. While Hungary is expected to ratify by mid-December at the latest, the assumption is that Turkey is likely to wait until after a general election in June 2023. But ratification by Turkey is still by no means certain. The bomb attack in Istanbul on 13 November that killed six people and injured 81 is likely to strengthen Turkey's resolve to seek further support from Finland and Sweden in dealing with Kurdish militants. No one claimed responsibility for the attack,

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but Turkish authorities quickly blamed the PKK, the Kurdish insurgency that has been fighting the Turkish army for decades, and the YPG, its Syrian affiliate (though they did not exclude an Islamic State connection). Ankara criticised Washington, which supports the YPG in its fight with the Islamic State in Syria. The Turkish Government regards the YPG as an extension of the PKK; it considers the group's quasi-autonomy in Syria encourages Kurdish militancy in Turkey.

Bülent Keneş: [Nato must call Turkey's bluff on my extradition](#), EU Observer, 14 November 2022

[Türkiye will ratify Nordic NATO bids only if promises met: Bozdağ](#), Daily Sabah, 14 November 2022

[A full-blown NATO-Sweden clash has just begun](#), TFI Global News, 13 November 2022

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