



## News Brief Update 24

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### Russia's war with Ukraine

Six months in and the war appears to be in a strategic deadlock, with neither side able to defeat the other. Russian troops have seized large parts of the east of the country, including the complete Luhansk region and a portion of Donetsk where they are slowly grinding forward in a brutal phase of fighting. In the south, however, Russian forces appear exposed to a potential Ukrainian counter-offensive. Since July, the Ukrainian army has used US-supplied HIMAR rocket systems to destroy four key bridges over the Dnipro river, and this week [attacked](#) Russian military hardware and other infrastructure in Crimea, prompting thousands to flee back to Russia.

#### ***Attacks in Crimea***

Explosions [erupted](#) across Crimea on 16 August, with reports of smoke and fire in at least three different areas where military bases or munitions depots are located. The first one, at an ammunition depot near Dzhankoi in the north, severely disrupted railway services and wounded two people. Ukraine hinted at involvement but has not explicitly claimed responsibility. The operation followed explosions at a Russian base in Crimea last week, which [severely damaged multiple aircraft](#). The attacks may be the work of Ukrainian forces that have [trained closely with US special forces](#) since 2014. Russia has sought to blame the attacks on acts of sabotage, and the top official in Russian-annexed Crimea [claimed](#) on 17 August that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had broken up a six-person terrorist cell of a banned Islamist group.

Mykhailo Podolyak, a key adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskiy [said](#) that there could be similar attacks in Crimea in the “next two or three months”, and later [said](#) that the 19-km Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea to the Russian mainland must be “dismantled”. The bridge is Moscow’s key military and civilian land corridor to the peninsula, and Podolyak’s comments implied it could become a military target for Ukrainian forces.

#### ***Further attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station***

Ukrainian and Russian officials reported further [shelling](#) near the Russian-held Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine, Europe’s largest, on 15 August with both sides once again blaming each other. Attacks the previous week had raised concerns about the potential for a nuclear accident (see NATO Watch [update 23](#)). One Russian-installed regional official said 25 heavy artillery strikes from US-made M777 howitzers had hit near the plant and residential areas. Ukraine said it was Russian forces that had shelled the city to try to make it appear that Ukraine was attacking it.

In his [address](#) on 15 August Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy called for action at the plant, urging the world not to lose to terrorism or “give in to nuclear blackmail”, while earlier on 13 August he [said](#) Ukrainian forces will target Russian soldiers who shoot at or from the nuclear plant. “Every Russian soldier who either shoots at the plant, or shoots using the plant as cover, must understand that he becomes a special target for our intelligence

agents, for our special services, for our army”, he said. On 17 August Ukrainian authorities performed [disaster response drills](#) near the plant.

With the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [warning](#) of a nuclear disaster unless fighting stops, Russia rejected [UN calls](#) for a demilitarized zone around the plant. In addition, on 14 August 42 countries and the EU [called](#) on Russia to immediately withdraw military forces from the plant and the entire country to safeguard the site. In a [statement](#) on 15 August, the Russian Foreign Ministry said it would allow specialists from the IAEA to visit the site - although a senior Russian diplomat [said](#) that any such IAEA mission could not pass through the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, and through the frontline as it was too dangerous. The UN says it has the logistics and security capacity to support a visit by IAEA experts. Ukraine’s military intelligence [warned](#) that Russian forces may be preparing to stage a “provocation” at the plant on the 19 August, and had information that staff with Russia’s Rosatom nuclear company had left the site. The UN Secretary General António Guterres again called for an urgent withdrawal of military forces from the site during his meeting with presidents Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 18 August (see below).

### ***Stalled diplomacy***

Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia took place for several months following the invasion, but they did not stop the war, and talks have been stalled for months. Before that, negotiations on Donbas had lasted for more than seven years with French and German participation; but despite signed agreements and a ceasefire, the conflict was never resolved. Each side blames the other for a lack of progress and there appears to be no real prospect for any diplomatic breakthroughs or ceasefires in the near future. Positions between the two sides remain incompatible: Ukraine insists on full sovereignty over all Ukrainian territory as it existed when Ukraine became independent in 1991, while Russia claims sovereignty over Crimea and

recognition of independence of the Donbas separatist republics. Moreover, Russia has recognized the independence of the Donbas republics on the whole administrative territory of the Donbas, even though some of that territory remains in Ukrainian hands and is the focus of current fighting.

France and Germany lead a NATO bloc favouring negotiations, while the US and UK lead a bloc that favour continuing to send more advanced weapons. One of the potential frameworks for a negotiated settlement is a four-point Italian proposal, calling for Ukraine committing to neutrality and not joining NATO, security guarantees for Ukraine, and negotiations between Ukraine and Russia on Crimea and the Donbas (see [NATO Watch Update 16](#)).

The UN Secretary-General António Guterres met President Zelenskiy and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the Western Ukrainian city, Lviv, on 18 August to discuss the grain export deal, attacks at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and the need for a political solution to the conflict. However, little immediate progress was [reported](#). Zelenskyy asked Guterres for the UN’s assistance in gaining access to captured Ukrainian citizens and Ukrainian soldiers captured by Russian forces, while Erdogan said that Turkey will support Ukrainian rebuilding efforts. Zelenskyy also requested the UN’s help with demilitarizing the area near the nuclear plant.

Earlier, Russia rejected a Swiss offer to act as a diplomatic mediator between Kyiv and Moscow, [according](#) to Al Jazeera. Citing Bern’s decision to join “illegal Western sanctions against Russia”, a Kremlin spokesperson said on 11 August that Switzerland has “unfortunately lost its status of a neutral state and could not act either as an intermediary or a representative”. Switzerland has often served as a go-between for even the bitterest of rivals, notably serving a key role in the diplomatic efforts that culminated in the signing of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015.

For options of what a possible settlement for Ukraine might look like, see Cambridge University's [Ukraine Peace Settlement Project](#).

### ***Military and financial assistance to Ukraine***

Ukraine continues to rely heavily on international military and financial support from Western states. In the five months since Russia launched its war in Ukraine, the United States has [pledged](#) about \$24 billion in military aid to Ukraine—more than four times Ukraine's 2021 defence budget. America's partners in Europe and beyond have [pledged](#) an additional \$12 billion, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

The US is readying about \$800 million of additional military aid to Ukraine, according to [reports](#). President Joe Biden will authorise the assistance using his presidential drawdown authority, which allows him to authorise the transfer of excess weapons from US stocks. In addition, Latvia has [supplied](#) six M109 howitzers to Ukraine, which are already in use according to reports. Finally, the British military is [training](#) 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers in marksmanship, battlefield first aid and urban warfare. The first batch of trainees arrived in July and have already returned to Ukraine. Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Nordic countries have also sent trainers.

For further details on arms transfers to Ukraine, see, the [Forum on the Arms Trade](#). And for a timeline of every US arms shipment to Ukraine that has been announced since the war began, see [here](#).

Canada [announced](#) on 17 August that it has disbursed C\$450 million in loans for the purchase of heating fuel for Ukraine, taking its total lending to Ukraine to C\$1.95 billion this year.

### ***Humanitarian consequences of the war***

Exact figures for the number of war fatalities, both military and civilian, are difficult to verify and confirm. [Undercounting and manipulation](#)

of the data is common in in war. Ukraine [claims](#) to have killed more than 43,000 Russian soldiers in the war to date, while the US [believes](#) Russia has suffered between 70,000 and 80,000 casualties, either killed or wounded. Ukraine has given no official total of soldiers killed during the war, but in early June, a senior Ukrainian presidential aide [told](#) BBC News 100-200 Ukrainian soldiers were dying in the Donbas region every day. In April, Russia [said](#) it had killed about 23,000 Ukrainian troops.

UN figures [revealed](#) that, as at 15 August, 5,514 civilians have died since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, including 356 children. The actual figures are likely to be considerably higher, as the receipt of information from some locations where intense hostilities have been going on has been delayed and many reports are still pending corroboration. According to [Action on Armed Violence](#) (AOAV) the number of casualties from explosive violence in the Ukrainian conflict reached 6,354 people by 19 August. From this number, 2,597 were killed and 3,757 were injured across 848 incidents. Ninety-six per cent (6,113) of civilian casualties have occurred in populated areas.

### ***Treatments of POWs***

Ukraine's security agencies issued a [joint statement](#) on 12 August calling for the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross to send representatives to locations where Russia is holding Ukrainian prisoners of war. The request follows earlier allegations by Kyiv that Moscow's forces have tortured and executed prisoners, including by staging an explosion in a Ukrainian PoW camp in Olenivka. Meanwhile, five Europeans face [trial](#) on mercenary charges in separatist-controlled Donetsk. Mathias Gustafsson of Sweden, Vjekoslav Prebeg of Croatia, and Britons John Harding, Andrew Hill and Dylan Healy all pleaded not guilty to charges of being mercenaries and "undergoing training to seize power by force", according to Russian media reports. They could face the death penalty under the laws of the self-proclaimed, unrecognised Donetsk People's Republic.

### ***Activities in occupied parts of Ukraine***

The Moscow-appointed administration in Ukraine's Kherson region plans to hold a referendum on 11 September, according to [reports](#). Referendums are also planned in three other Ukrainian regions – Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia – where Moscow aims to annex the territories and declare them to be a new region of Russia. Meanwhile, Ukraine's health minister [accused](#) Russian authorities of committing a crime against humanity by blocking access to affordable medicines and hospitals in occupied areas.

Reports [suggest](#) that Ukrainian artillery struck the main military base of the Wagner group in eastern Ukraine. It is unclear how much damage was sustained to the base of the Russian paramilitary group, but the strike was reportedly conducted using HIMAR rocket systems.

### **Further reading:**

#### **On outcomes and consequences of the war**

George Beebe and Anatol Lieven, [On Russian invasion, US intel got it right — but policymakers stumbled](#), Responsible Statecraft, 19 August 2022

Connor Echols, [By the numbers: Keeping track of the single largest arms transfer in US history](#), Responsible Statecraft, 18 August 2022

[Ukraine war: Drone pilots mark targets for new offensive](#), BBC News, 18 August 2022

Andrii Chubyk, [How scary is threat to Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant?](#) EU Observer, 18 August 2022

[Slovakia's plan to sell fighter jets to Ukraine divides a nation](#), EuroNews, 18 August 2022

Samantha Bradshaw, Renee DiResta and Christopher Giles, [How Unmoderated Platforms Became the Frontline for Russian Propaganda](#), Lawfare, 17 August 2022

[What is Russia's Wagner Group of mercenaries in Ukraine?](#) BBC News, 16 August 2022

[Ukraine Defies Russia with Attacks on Crimea, a 'Holy Land' to Putin](#), New York Times, 16 August 2022

Jon Henley and Samantha Lock, [Russia says "Nyet" to UN calls for DMZ around Ukrainian nuclear plant](#), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 August 2022

William Hartung, [There's a nuclear catastrophe on the horizon in Ukraine](#), Responsible Statecraft, 12 August 2022

Andrii Chubyk, [New Gas Security: Ukraine's EU Supplying Potential](#), Globsec commentary, 10 August 2022

Phyllis Bennis, [Further Comment: It's Time for Diplomacy](#), The Progressive Magazine, 9 August 2022

### **On investigations of war crimes in Ukraine and other legal processes**

The ICC in the Hague opened an investigation into possible war crimes in Ukraine just days after Moscow's forces invaded and it dispatched dozens of investigators to the country to gather evidence. On 14 July, 45 countries [agreed](#) at a conference in the Hague to coordinate investigations into suspected war crimes in Ukraine. The Ukrainian security service has [identified](#) eight additional Russian soldiers suspected of war crimes in Bucha. These eight servicemen, most of them of unit 6720 of the federal service of the national guard of the Russian federation, are accused of looting property and ransacking abandoned homes. Previously, Ukraine's prosecutor general, Iryna Venediktova, [identified](#) at least 10 soldiers allegedly involved in human rights abuses in Bucha,

### **On the risk of nuclear war**

During a speech at the Moscow international security conference on 16 August, the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu [said](#) Russia has no need to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, while also alleging that Ukrainian military operations were being planned by the US and Britain, and that NATO had increased its troop deployment in eastern and central Europe

“several times over”. The Russian government recently [announced](#) it would suspend inspections under New START, the last remaining nuclear weapons treaty between Russia and the United States, in response to war-related sanctions. Meanwhile, after several postponements due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the 10th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is taking place in New York (from 1 to 26 August 2022). However, the prospects for a productive outcome [remain slim](#).

[Putin Ally Promotes Nuclear Strike on NATO to Counter Military Superiority](#), Newsweek, 16 August 2022

### **On sanctions against Russia and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine**

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine galvanized the US, UK and EU, and a handful of other Western-aligned countries, to unleash a series of sanctions meant to punish Vladimir Putin’s government and pressure him to pull his forces back. While the sanctions lists are sometimes difficult to interpret, the EU has [sanctioned](#) 1,158 individuals and 98 entities—an approximate doubling of its entire sanctions portfolio across the dozens of sanctions regimes it implements; the UK also roughly doubled its portfolio (excluding the UN listings it is obligated to implement) having [imposed](#) sanctions on over 1,000 individuals and over 100 businesses; and the US has [sanctioned](#) more than 1,000 individuals or organizations since the invasion. The numbers, and the pace of the rollout, dwarf the sanctions lists for the likes of Iran, North Korea, Libya, the thematic counterterrorism lists, and all others.

However, rather than dissuading the Kremlin as intended, the penalties appear instead to be exacerbating inflation, worsening food insecurity and punishing ordinary Russians more than Putin or his allies. Moreover, Russia has claimed (see NATO Watch [Update 17](#) and [Update 18](#)) that it is getting more revenue from its fossil fuel sales now than before its invasion of Ukraine, despite (or partly because of) Western sanctions. According to an economy

ministry document seen by Reuters, Russia [foresees](#) a 38% rise in energy export earnings this year to reach \$337.5 billion due to higher oil export volumes, coupled with rising gas prices. Meanwhile, Indian officials [said](#) on 12 August that there was no pressure on the country from western countries or anywhere else over its energy purchases from Russia. India, the world’s third-biggest crude importer, overtook China to become the biggest buyer of Russian oil in July based on sea-borne volumes, having bought very little from Russia before the start of the war in Ukraine.

Several European countries have [called](#) for the EU to limit or block short-term Schengen visas for Russian citizens. Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Finland and the Czech Republic all urged new restrictions. Estonia is the first EU country to [prohibit](#) tourist travel by Russian citizens (as from 18 August), while Poland is also considering restrictions for Russian tourist visas. On the same day, Estonian government officials [said](#) they intend to take down Soviet monuments in the country. Meanwhile, efforts to isolate Russia at the UN have stalled, [according](#) to Reuters. Despite early success in rallying the international community against Moscow’s invasion, Western countries are shying away from some specific moves fearing a growing unwillingness among many states to publicly oppose Moscow.

Daniel Salisbury, [Can the Private Sector Help Cut Russia’s Silicon Lifeline?](#) RUSI Commentary, 19 August 2022

James Dorsey, [Russia sanctions are spurring a new Silk Road](#), Responsible Statecraft, 13 August 2022

Anatol Lieven, [Bans on Russian travel and culture play into Putin’s hands](#), Responsible Statecraft, 12 August 2022

James Byrne, Gary Somerville, Joe Byrne, Dr Jack Watling, Nick Reynolds and Jane Baker, [Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine](#), RUSI Report, 8 August 2022

## On international food security and Ukrainian grain exports

The [announcement](#) on 22 July of a grain deal between Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the UN – which could allow Ukraine to export up to 22 million tons of grain stuck in its ports via the Black Sea – was a rare ray of light. The resumption of food exports could prove crucial for Ukraine's economy as well as global food security (on international food security and Ukrainian grain exports, see NATO Watch [Update 17](#), [Update 18](#), [Update 20](#) and [Update 21](#)). The resumption of grain exports is being overseen by a Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul where Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN personnel are working. The first wartime shipment of UN food aid for Africa [reached](#) the Bosphorus Strait on 17 August under the deal to restore Ukrainian grain deliveries across the Black Sea. Marine traffic sites showed the MV Brave Commander taking its cargo of 23,000 tonnes of wheat across the heart of Istanbul bound for its final destination in Djibouti next week.

## On developments within Ukraine

Ukraine's parliament voted on 15 August to extend martial law for a further three months. The Ukrainian parliament imposed martial law after the start of the conflict with Russia on 24 February and has extended it three times since then. Meanwhile, the website of Ukraine's nuclear energy agency, Energoatom, experienced a cyberattack, which the agency [said](#) was executed by Russian hackers. Officials in the spring also noted an unsuccessful attempt to disrupt the country's energy system, which if successful would have left two million Ukrainians without power.

Pavlo Sheremeta, [A Tough Macroeconomic Balancing Act in Ukraine](#), Globsec commentary, 11 August 2022

Yaroslav Zhalilo, [Exchange rate correction: Adapting Ukraine's economy to wartime realities](#), Globsec commentary, 9 August 2022

## On developments within Russia

Two Russian villages were [evacuated](#) after a fire broke out at an ammunition depot near the border with Ukraine on 18 August. The cause of the fire was unclear. Meanwhile, the Russian military [announced](#) the same day that it has deployed combat aircraft armed with hypersonic missiles to the country's Kaliningrad region, a move that has been broadly interpreted as a response to the west arming Ukraine.

On 16 August, a Russian court [fined](#) the US-based streaming service Twitch for hosting a short video containing what the court called "fake" information about alleged war crimes in Bucha – a Ukrainian town out of which there have been numerous [verified accounts](#) of Russian soldiers torturing, killing and sexually assaulting civilians. Though the content of the video was not specified, Russia has repeatedly threatened to fine sites such as Google, Twitter and Wikipedia, accusing them of hosting "fake" content related to its military campaign in Ukraine.

Russia has warned the US that potentially placing Russia on the US State Department's list of [state sponsors of terrorism](#) could be a diplomatic "point of no return", and trigger a total breakdown of relations between the two countries. In a [press briefing](#) on 11 August, however, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel downplayed suggestions that the United States could follow Latvia in designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, arguing that current US sanctions are already having a major impact on Moscow.

Emily Ferris, [The Backbone of Russia: Russian Railways Turns to Iran](#), RUSI Commentary, 10 August 2022

## On China's position on the war

China has refused to condemn Russia's invasion and its president, Xi Jinping, told Putin it would support Russia's "sovereignty and security". NATO's new [Strategic Concept](#) asserts that there is a "deepening strategic partnership" between China and Russia. Chinese troops will travel to Russia to take part

in joint [‘Vostok’ military exercises](#) from 30 August to 5 September, alongside Belarus, India, Mongolia and Tajikistan. The Chinese Defence Ministry said that the exercises are “unrelated to the current international and regional situation”. The announcement came a day after a Chinese naval vessel [arrived](#) in Sri Lanka, drawing opposition from the United States and India.

Iuliia Osmolovska, [Apple of Discord: How Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan Buried Hopes for China’s Co-Mediation on Russia’s War in Ukraine](#), Globesec, 6 August 2022

### **On developments within NATO**

Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo flared in August when Pristina said it would oblige Serbs living in the north, who are backed by Belgrade and do not recognise Kosovo institutions, to start using car license plates issued in Pristina. The situation calmed after Kosovo agreed to postpone the number plates rule until 1 September and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), with nearly 4,000 troops in the country, oversaw the removal of roadblocks set up by Serbs. The NATO Secretary General held separate meetings in Brussels on 17 August with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti to discuss the recent tensions, a day ahead of EU-facilitated talks between the two leaders. “I call on all sides to show restraint and to avoid violence,” Stoltenberg [said](#).

Estonia has been hit by extensive [cyber-attacks](#) after removing a Soviet-era tank monument from a region whose population is predominantly ethnic Russians, its government said. Estonia’s foreign minister also defended his country’s decision to bar Russian tourists (see above).

Lucia Garcia Rico, [NATO and Climate Change: A Climatized Perspective on Security](#), Belfer Center Report, 18 August 2022

Jan Oberg et al, [Abolish NATO or Convert It To Serve Peace: 30 Arguments & 100s of Inspirations](#), TFF, 18 August 2022

J. Lukačević, K. Kertýsová and R. Heise, [The climate-space nexus: new approaches for](#)

[strengthening NATO’s resilience](#), NATO Review, 18 August 2022

James Carden, [Military’s search for tech zen goes transnational](#), Responsible Statecraft, 17 August 2022

[NATO says it is ready to step up forces if Serbia-Kosovo tensions escalate](#), Reuters, 17 August 2022

[Joint press conference](#) with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, 17 August 2022

[NATO Secretary General meets with Albin Kurti of Kosovo](#), NATO News Release, 17 August 2022

[NATO Secretary General meets with President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia](#), NATO News Release, 17 August 2022

Lawrence Abrams, [Microsoft disrupts Russian hackers’ operation on NATO targets](#), Bleeping Computer, 15 August 2022

[Analysts: Send NATO Troops to help stabilize BiH!](#), Sarajevo Times, 14 August 2022

Leon Hartwell, Hikmet Karčić, and Josephine Mintel, [Send NATO Troops to Help Stabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), War on the Rocks, 12 August 2022

George Beebe, [Why we can’t rely on NATO to make Europe whole again](#), Responsible Statecraft, 12 August 2022

George Beebe, [NATO’s Tunnel Vision](#), QUINCY Brief No. 28, 11 August 2022

Federico Borsani, [Ignore NATO’s Southern Flank at Your Peril](#), CEPA, 11 August 2022

[U.S. Air Division Deploying Soldiers as Kremlin Says Russia, NATO at War](#), Newsweek, 11 August 2022

[Summit prepares ground for ‘NATOisation of Europe’ and continues collision course with China and high levels of military spending](#), NATO Watch Briefing No.96, 6 July 2022

## On Finland and Sweden joining NATO

Finland and Sweden were invited to join NATO, after a [trilateral memorandum](#) with Turkey agreed on the eve of the NATO Madrid Summit assuaged Ankara's previous objections. The two Nordic countries will become NATO members after the Accession Protocol is ratified by all 30 member states. The invitation to Finland and Sweden represents a major geopolitical shift in Europe as the two countries move away from neutrality.

However, ratification by Turkey is still by no means certain. The trilateral agreement could still falter on implementation, especially regarding Turkish extradition requests. To date, 23 NATO member states have ratified the decision, with the USA the most recent to do so. The Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey are the seven member states where parliaments have not yet been asked to vote on Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO.

Mikael Lohse, [As a NATO Member Finland Will Be a Security Provider](#), E-International Relations, 16 August 2022

[Scholz confident Sweden's NATO membership 'will now progress very quickly'](#), Deutsche Welle, 16 August 2022

[France's President Emmanuel Macron Signs NATO Membership Protocols for Finland and Sweden](#), Republic World, 14 August 2022

Gene Germanovich, [Finnish, Swedish NATO membership will make for stronger, smarter alliance](#), UPI, 12 August 2022

[NATO Quid Pro Quo? Sweden to Extradite Fugitive to Turkey](#), National Interest, 12 August 2022

[Sweden agrees to extradite man to Turkey in wake of NATO deal](#), Reuters, 11 August 2022

For further details see:

[Murky trilateral agreement results in Turkey lifting objections to Finland and Sweden's NATO application](#), NATO Watch News Brief, 29 June 2022

[Should Finland and Sweden hold a referendum on NATO membership?](#) NATO Watch Briefing no. 93, 6 May 2022

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