The Pentagon was reportedly unhappy with the depiction of the US missile defence system in the new Netflix film, A House of Dynamite. At one point in the film, the fictional defence secretary complains that current missile defences have only a 50% chance of intercepting a missile despite their $50bn price tag. Another character in the film, the deputy national security adviser, puts the figure at 61%.
In an internal memorandum dated 16 October from the Missile Defence Agency (MDA) obtained by Bloomberg the agency states that while the film “highlights that deterrence can fail, which reinforces the need for an active homeland missile defense system”, its fictional depiction also downplays US capabilities.
“The fictional interceptors in the movie miss their target, and we understand this is intended to be a compelling part of the drama intended for the entertainment of the audience,” but results from real-world testing “tell a vastly different story”, the memo reportedly states, adding the 50% claim is based on earlier prototypes. The memo also claims that today’s interceptors “have displayed a 100% accuracy rate in testing for more than a decade”. This is patently not true.
While some individual systems have achieved perfect records over shorter, specific testing periods, the overall and long-term test record for US BMD programmes is mixed and significantly lower than 100%. Success rates vary significantly depending on the specific system (e.g., Ground-Based Midcourse Defence (GMD), Aegis BMD, THAAD, Patriot) and the type of target missile (short, medium, intermediate or intercontinental range).
The GMD system is designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and has a particularly mixed record, with approximately 12 successful intercepts in 21 attempts between 1999 and 2023 (around 55%), and a lower success rate in tests since its nominal deployment in 2004. No GMD flight tests were successful between 2010 and 2013.ICBMs due to their high speeds are extremely difficult to hit. The relative success of theatre missile defences against shorter-range, slower moving ballistic missiles (estimated at about 80% in the recent Iran-Israel conflict) does not mean that strategic missile defence can be anywhere near as effective, even with huge expenditure.
The film actually underestimates the current BMD spend, which is more than $60 billion on the ground-based interceptor system shown in the film and hundreds of billions more on missile defences across decades.
However, it should also be noted that the tests are often conducted under highly scripted or controlled conditions, making the success rates not fully representative of real-world operational performance. And even if successful, the system can still be overwhelmed by a greater number of offensive missiles. The United States currently maintains a total of 44 interceptors at bases in Alaska and California, while Russia and China possess hundreds of ballistic missiles.
In short, the complexities and countermeasures expected in real-world combat strongly affirm the doubts portrayed in the film about the actual effectiveness of the BMD systems against sophisticated missile threats. Given that deterrence will fail at some point and BMD offers little more than a coin toss chance of interception, the only guarantee of safety from nuclear weapons is a world without nuclear weapons.