This is an extract from the Reaching Critical Will E-News, March 2026 and is reproduced with the kind permission of Ray Acheson at RCW.
In February 2026, Polish President Karol Nawrocki said Poland should begin working toward developing nuclear weapons and base its security strategy on “nuclear potential,” arguing that Russia’s aggression and waning trust in US security guarantees require stronger “deterrence”. On 2 March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced he will increase France’s nuclear stockpile and work with other countries on an “advanced deterrence strategy,” including Poland as well as the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark. “The next 50 years will be an era of nuclear weapons," proclaimed Macron. In a pre-speech document released to the press, France indicated that a nuclear strike “could be carried out as a warning,” and that France would no longer be disclosing details about its nuclear arsenal.
In addition, France and Germany jointly declared that they would increase their military cooperation, including “German conventional participation in French nuclear exercises and joint visits to strategic sites” and “consultations regarding the appropriate mix of conventional, missile defence and French nuclear capabilities.” As the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) points out, the declaration reiterates North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) language on nuclear weapons and commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it does not commit France and Germany to the aim of nuclear disarmament. ICAN’s Executive Director Melissa Parke said, “This announcement from French President Macron is a direct threat to the peace and security of the region, and the world. France already spent $6 billion on its nuclear weapons in 2024 and it is unclear how much this unexpected increase will add to that exorbitant sum. This is not progress, it’s a nuclear arms race that no one can afford.”
The same day, Canada announced it will supply nuclear-armed India with uranium. The ten-year deal comes as India is accelerating its plans to expand nuclear power. This kind of nuclear cooperation with a non-NPT state party, which operates without full scope safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), raises serious concerns about Canada’s compliance with the NPT and global non-proliferation standards. It was Canadian reactors, given to India for “peaceful uses” in the 1970s, that India used to develop nuclear weapons. This led to a suspension of nuclear cooperation between the two countries, which is now being resumed.
As Nazia Sheikh, a researcher with the Centre for International Strategic Studies points out, importing uranium from Canada would allow India to develop and exploit its domestic uranium deposits for the production of nuclear weapons. “Such agreements would jeopardise international efforts to revitalize arms-control accords at a time when nuclear politics are being reshaped by great-power rivalry,” warns Sheikh, noting, “When great powers prioritize strategic partnerships and financial benefits ahead of long-standing arms control obligations, the legitimacy and universality of the international non-proliferation framework are also compromised.”
These new partnerships of nuclear cooperation and expansion within Europe and between Canada and India are arguably in violation of the NPT’s rules and principles. Both arrangements increase regional and global instability and discrimination, and incentivise further nuclear proliferation at a time when disarmament, demilitarisation, and denuclearisation is absolutely imperative. Reaching Critical Will calls on all parties involved to step back from the brink, recommit to their obligations under the NPT, and join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPWN) to end the reign of terror of the nuclear era forever.
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