By Alexander Gilder*
This commentary was first published here by Rethinking Security on 15 July 2025 and is reproduced with their kind permission and that of the author.
Since 2022 NATO has endorsed a Human Security approach in relation to its core tasks. Yet its 2025 Summit fell silent on this, among many other issues. Alexander Gilder makes the case for why Human Security must stay on NATO’s agenda in order to bolster the Atlantic alliance’s legitimacy and effectiveness.
With rising geopolitical tensions NATO must continue its commitment to the Human Security Agenda. But with the US making cuts to civilian harm mitigation and Baltic allies withdrawing from key arms control treaties, the future of human security policy is on shaky ground.
In 2022 NATO adopted an approach and set of guiding principles on ‘human security’. NATO is therefore bound to embedding a commitment to human security that ensures the comprehensive safety and security of populations, across all stages and levels of Alliance operations, wherever NATO operates. While NATO’s definition of human security includes different hallmarks than the original one popularised by the UN Development Programme in the 1990s, this does represent a change in organizational thinking that requires NATO to be people-centred, integrate gender perspectives, take preventative measures, consider local customs and more.
NATO sees human security as central to its approach to deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security and as a cohesive approach to the Alliance’s five existing cross-cutting topics. These are: the Protection of Civilians (PoC); the protection of children in armed conflict (CAAC); Cultural Property Protection (CPP); preventing and responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB). Work is underway within NATO to explore how human security can contribute to the Alliance’s other core tasks – deterrence and defence and cooperative security.
The future of human security is at risk
The further development of doctrine on human security and NATO’s commitment to putting human security at the centre of its operations is under threat. The US has made drastic cuts to the Department of Defense’s Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response office – a key contributor to the development of doctrine on PoC. This is despite the DoD saying in 2022 that civilian harm mitigation “is not only a moral imperative, it is also critical to achieving long-term success on the battlefield.”
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) has also been on the chopping block at the DoD this year. Whilst WPS is separate to human security in the NATO approach, both are the responsibility of the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security. Unlike the 2022, 2023 and 2024 NATO Summit Declarations, The Hague Summit Declaration issued on 25 June 2025 makes no mention of NATO’s commitment to human security. This may be a consequence of the US withdrawing political support for the human security approach or simply a result of bigger questions, such as defence spending, taking centre stage. Nevertheless, without US thought-leadership and buy-in, the question arises whether the other member states can continue to drive the development and implementation of human security?
On NATO’s eastern flank several member states, including Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and (later) Finland announced they would leave the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. Lithuania similarly withdrew from the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2024.
Given the possibility of future Russian aggression, these states do not wish to be constrained by legal obligations that would prevent them from using these weapons systems in defence of their territory. For instance, the Finnish Prime Minister explained, “[w]ithdrawing from the Ottawa Convention will give us the possibility to prepare for the changes in the security environment in a more versatile way.” However, with 165 state parties the Ottawa Convention has been a huge step forward in eliminating the long-term human suffering caused by such landmines. Maintaining current NATO policy ensuring the comprehensive safety and security of civilian populations may be seen by these states as a burden when warfighting and therefore a barrier to effective defence.
Human security improves NATO’s effectiveness and legitimacy
Human security is vital not only for its ethical purposes but requires NATO to maintain a deep understanding of the human environment that enables greater freedom of manoeuvre and effectiveness of NATO operations.
For NATO, a human security approach “allows us to develop a more comprehensive view of the human environment” that enables improved effectiveness in achieving the goals of the cross-cutting topics (including PoC, CAAC, CRSV, CPP and CTHB). Embedding a human security approach into NATO’s planning and operating processes recognizes that the effects of conflict are experienced differently by affected population groups. By having a deep understanding of the human environment NATO can prevent unintended consequences caused by NATO military operations and minimize avoidable harm.
Recent conflicts have seen devastating losses of life where states have been alleged to commit mass murder of civilians or use starvation as a weapon of war. In a conflict situation, NATO’s adversaries may commit crimes or precipitate humanitarian crisis as part of their strategy with the aim of degrading NATO’s effectiveness. By ensuring its planning and exercises analyse and respond to the complex human environment in which the conflict is fought, NATO can be better prepared to handle adversaries that use civilians in this way.
In a collective defence situation, human security is an enabler. NATO will not want to unnecessarily harm civilians in a member state nor destroy civilian objects that may be needed during post-conflict recovery. A human security approach enhances operational effectiveness and the capacity of NATO forces to support the host nation in its primary duty to protect its population by contributing to a safe and secure environment and mitigating adversarial harm to the population.
One way of achieving this is integrating NATO’s existing analytical frameworks for assessing the operational environment (e.g. PMESII-ASCOPE) with detailed human security factor analysis. NATO commanders can then have a clearer picture of the battlefield, increase awareness of the effects of their operations on affected populations, civilian objects and services to avoid or mitigate harm, and enhance freedom of movement and action. This could be an important way to lessen the civilian harm inflicted by a large-scale conflict of great powers – especially in situations where the adversary was deliberately endangering the civilian population to degrade NATO’s effectiveness.
A human security approach helps to makes NATO a more credible actor and helps to build support for NATO’s actions among local populations which would be critical to sustaining an ally’s will to fight. For instance, Russian targeting of civilians, use of CRSV and destruction of civilian infrastructure and cultural property is a deliberate course of action aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian resilience. Even outside the conventional battlefield, Russia misinforms and seeks to subvert democracy, human rights, pluralism and equality in the political arena. A human security approach counters this political threat by requiring NATO to differentiate itself through its treatment of conflict affected populations and its concern for their rights and well-being. The legitimacy accrued by this approach may prove vital in countering the political threat to NATO countries.
NATO members must reiterate their commitment to a human security approach and develop doctrine on human security as a matter of priority. Human security presents a continued opportunity for NATO to advance cohesion and solidarity across allies and other like-minded nations. By demonstrating its commitment to the implementation of human security as a reflection of its core values and the security of civilians, NATO can differentiate itself from adversaries who deliberately target civilians.
* Alexander Gilder is Associate Professor of International Law and Security at the University of Reading. He is also an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Associate Faculty in the School of Humanitarian Studies at Royal Roads University (Canada). His research focuses on UN peacekeeping and human security in military operations, particularly those of NATO and its member states. Alex has worked as an Academic Consultant at the NATO HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and as a Subject Matter Expert for the Ministry of Defence (UK). Views expressed are personal and do not represent the views of NATO or the Ministry of Defence.