Avoiding an escalation trap

Using confidence and security building measures to deescalate Russian violations of NATO airspace 

9 October 2025

This policy brief examines recent alleged Russian violations of NATO airspace in 2025, the alliance’s responses, and proposes transparency, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to reduce the risk of escalation. 

Context and recent incidents

• A notable spike in alleged incursions by Russian crewed aircraft and drones across multiple NATO states (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Romania and Sweden-related airspace events) has raised tensions and prompted two NATO Article 4 consultations and UN Security Council briefings (see Annex).
• Incidents range from brief transits by combat aircraft with transponders off to large drone swarms entering Polish airspace, some resulting in shoot-downs or airspace closures 

Ambiguity of intent and motives

• Determining whether incursions are deliberate provocations, navigational errors or technical failures is often unclear. Examples: GPS jamming and decoy drones (Gerbera/Geran-2) can cause drones to stray; inexperienced pilots or navigational malfunctions could explain crewed aircraft deviations.
• Russia denies responsibility in many cases; divergent interpretations among NATO members complicate unified responses.

NATO posture, air policing and ROE

• The NATO Baltic air policing mission provides continuous surveillance, quick reaction alerts, interception, identification and escort capabilities, backed by AWACS and integrated air command.
• NATO launched “Eastern Sentry” to bolster eastern flank deterrence and surveillance following escalatory incidents.
• Rules of engagement (ROE) govern when force may be used; NATO MC 362/2 (classified) underpins these. Responses usually follow an escalation ladder: radio warnings, visual signals, escort, and lethal force only as last resort or self-defence—national ROE can differ, leading to potential miscalculation.

Debate over shoot-downs and escalation risk

• Some member states (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and others) advocate shooting down violators if necessary; others (Germany, Finland) counsel restraint to avoid an “escalation trap.”
• Historical precedent (Turkey–Russia 2015) offers lessons but differs materially from the current Ukraine context.

Transparency trade-offs

• Declassifying ROE could reduce miscalculation and reassure publics, but risks operational compromise: adversaries could exploit thresholds, constrain flexibility or reverse-engineer sensor and authorisation limits.
• Proposals include partial disclosure (e.g., Baltic Air Policing ROE, threshold matrices, delayed release, parliamentary in-camera inspection).

Proposed CSBMs to reduce escalation

• Eight practical, staged CSBMs: a 24/7 air-incident military hotline; joint NATO–Russia incident review board with neutral arbiter; voluntary pre-notification of high-risk flights; transponder mandates in sensitive corridors; ‘no first weapon-lock’ pledge; joint civil-military ATC exchange days; drone-specific protocols; and pre-approved emergency landing rights. 

These measures prioritise operational safety, predictability, and reversibility—aiming to reduce accidents and manage disputes without requiring political trust, at least initially. For further details please read the attached pdf.