By Tariq Rauf*
This article was first published by In Depth News on 14 October 2024 and is reproduced here under the Creative Commons licence.
As the ink dried on the announcement of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2024 to Nihon Hidankyo, the grassroots movement of the Hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki); the merchants of death continued weapons supplies to ongoing wars in central Europe and in Gaza and Lebanon, the dogs of war continued to bay, and the drums of nuclear war continued to beat unabated both from Russia and NATO headquarters in Brussels.
In the charged strategic environment of central Europe, High Noon comes in the form of “Steadfast Noon” and “Strike Warrior” in the skies over Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the North Sea. Regarding the two nuclear war exercises, a NATO spokesperson stated: “Strike Warrior runs parallel with Steadfast Noon 24; use of the same exercise airspace; respective flight operations are time wise separated. Some Steadfast Noon participants will also take part in Strike Warrior 24 outside of Steadfast Noon flying periods”.
Despite risks of miscalculation and accidents, NATO begins its annual nuclear war exercise “Steadfast Noon” starting on Monday (14 October 2024) for two weeks. Several dual-capable aircraft, certified to carry US nuclear and conventional weapons, are slated to take part in sorties simulating nuclear attack on an adversary.
Steadfast Noon is expected to involve 2,000 military personnel from NATO eight airbases. Most of the exercise will be held around 900 kilometres from Russia, and Moscow has been informed about the drills according to NATO officials. “In an uncertain world, it is vital that we test our defence and that we strengthen our defence so that our adversaries know that NATO is ready and is able to respond to any threat,” new NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte told reporters in London.
Reportedly, the aircraft types in this year’s Steadfast Noon includes nuclear-capable strike jets, strategic bombers, fighter escorts, refuelling aircraft and reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft. The participating air force units are to be drawn from: Belgian Air Component F-16 Fighting Falcon; Czech Air Force JAS-39 Gripen; Royal Danish Air Force F-16; German Air Force A400M, EF-2000 and Tornado; Finnish Air Force F/A-18 Hornet; Hellenic Air Force F-16; Italian Air Force Tornado and KC-767; NATO E-3A; NATO Multinational Tanker Unit A330 MRTT; RAF Typhoon, Voyager and RAF/RN F-35B Lightning; Royal Netherlands Air Force F-35A Lightning; Polish Air Force F-16; Romanian Air Force F-16; Turkish Air Force F-16; US Air Force B-52H Stratofortress; F-15E Strike Eagle, F-35 and KC-135 Stratotanker.
The first Steadfast Noon exercise was held in 2003. Since then, it has become an annual event, focusing on nuclear deterrence and readiness among NATO member States. The exercise goal is described to ensure that participating forces are prepared for potential nuclear war scenarios, emphasizing NATO’s commitment to collective defence. “We fly against a fictional adversary and our scenarios do not reflect current world events,” according Daniel Bunch, Chief of Nuclear Operations at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), located at Casteau (Mons, Belgium).
Origins and Context
The origins of NATO’s various military exercises, involving simulated nuclear weapons use, can be traced back to NATO’s Cold War perceived need to respond to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which included demonstrably maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent.
Steadfast Noon is part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy, where certain member countries participate in the planning and potential use of nuclear weapons, including strikes on an adversary by five NATO non-nuclear-weapon States’ air forces to deliver US non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.
Steadfast Noon has evolved over the years, becoming an annual event designed to train military personnel on the delivery of nuclear weapons, ensuring that NATO forces are prepared for any scenario involving nuclear warfare.
In recent years, Steadfast Noon has adapted to address contemporary security challenges, including rising tensions with Russia and new geopolitical dynamics, reflecting NATO’s commitment to collective defence. Overall, Steadfast Noon is stated to demonstrate NATO’s ongoing commitment to nuclear deterrence and readiness in an ever-changing security landscape. “Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Allied security,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has stated. “Steadfast Noon is an important test of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent and sends a clear message to any adversary that NATO will protect and defend all Allies”.
Arguments For and Against Steadfast Noon
The decision for NATO to continue to conduct annual nuclear war exercises such as Steadfast Noon amidst heightened nuclear risks due to the Ukraine war is complex and involves several considerations.
Deterrence: Conducting such exercises can reinforce NATO’s commitment to collective defence and deterrence, sending a clear message to potential aggressors that NATO remains prepared to respond decisively.
Readiness: Regular exercises ensure that military personnel are trained and ready for any nuclear scenario, maintaining a state of preparedness that is crucial in times of heightened tensions.
Alliance Cohesion: Joint exercises strengthen cooperation among member States, fostering unity and demonstrating solidarity in the face of external threats.
Escalation Risks: Nuclear war exercises could be perceived as provocative, potentially escalating tensions further with adversaries and increasing the risk of miscalculations or misunderstandings.
Public Perceptions: The exercises may raise concerns and fears among the public and within member States about the implications and consequences of even a “small” nuclear war over the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Focus on Diplomacy: Astute observers may posit that resources and attention should be directed towards diplomatic efforts and de-escalation to increase strategic stability and reduce nuclear war risks rather than provocative military displays that could heighten tensions and dangers of accidents and miscalculation.
Nuclear Weapons in Europe
NATO’s Washington Summit declaration, of 10 July 2024, makes clear that “the fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression,” It states that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance … NATO remains committed to taking all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety, and security of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence mission, including by modernising its nuclear capabilities, strengthening its nuclear planning capability, and adapting as necessary.”
According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the United States Air Force (USAF) currently stores an estimated 100 nuclear warheads in Europe, down from 180 in 2010 and 480 in 2000.
Five NATO non-nuclear-weapon States – Belgium, Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Turkey – host the US non-strategic warheads at six air bases. The air forces of these five States operate “dual-capable” aircraft that are equipped and certified to carry US nuclear warheads. In a war situation, under NATO and USAF command, air force pilots of Belgium Italy, Germany, Netherlands, and Turkey would take part in operational sorties to attack targets in an adversary (Russia) with nuclear weapons.
US nuclear weapons in Europe are the B61 (Mark 61) intermediate and low (variable) yield tactical thermonuclear (two stage radiation implosion) warheads – known as the “silver bullet” thermonuclear bomb. The Mod-3 warhead version has available Yields (Kt): 0.3 / 1.5 / 60 / 170; while the Mod-4 has available Yields (Kt): 0.3 / 1.5 / 10 / 45.
The B61 bomb can be delivered as a free-fall or a retarded airburst, a free fall surface burst, or in a “laydown” mode from aircraft flying as low as 15 metres. The latter method requires that the bomb survive ground impact, which is accomplished through use of a parachute that quickly slows the bomb’s descent and controls its trajectory. The basic bomb weighs approximately 320 kilogrammes, is slightly about 33 centimetres in diameter, and 4 metres in length, from nose to fin-tip.
The B61 (Mark 61) Mod.3 and Mod.4 nuclear warheads are located at six air bases in five NATO States:
- Belgium: Kleine Brogel air base: 15 B61 3-4 / delivered by F-16 dual-capable aircraft.
- Germany: Buchel air base: 15 B61 3-4 / delivered by Panavia 200 Tornado dual-capable aircraft.
- Italy: Aviano air base: 20 3-4 / delivered by F16 (USAF) dual-capable aircraft.
- Italy: Ghedi air base: 15 B61 Mod.3-4 / delivered by Panavia 200 Tornado dual-capable aircraft.
- Netherlands: Volkel air base: 15 B61 Mod.3-4 / delivered by F-16 dual-capable aircraft.
- Turkey: Incirlik air base: 20 B61 Mod.3-4 / delivered by F-16 dual-capable aircraft.
In February 2018, the Trump administration in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reported that Russia had “an active stockpile of up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons…”. According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Russia has been retiring old non-strategic nuclear weapons and is in a transition between old and new types that creates fluctuations in the estimate. Russia’s military strategy relies more on such weapons to compensate for its inferior conventional capabilities – that has been the case for the past two decades – as well as to seek overall global balance in Russian and US nuclear warhead numbers.
Angus Lapsley, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, has stated that Moscow has been investing in its nuclear forces “with accelerating intensity” over the last two years, and that it is “introducing lots of novel systems and putting more emphasis on investment in short and intermediate range weapons systems”.
Earlier this year, in May, Russian forces launched nuclear war exercises on 7-9 May and later expanded to include nuclear bombers on 27-31 May, to simulate preparation for the launch of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow linked the exercises to what it called “militant statements” by Western officials, including French President Emmanuel Macron, which created security threats for Russia. The Russian Defence Ministry reportedly claimed that the first stage of the exercise involved Iskander and Kinzhal missiles to ensure that units and equipment were ready for “the combat use of non-strategic nuclear weapons to respond and unconditionally ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian State in response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials against the Russian Federation”.
In July this year, Russia carried out the third stage of exercises to practice the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, “In accordance with the decision of the president of the Russian Federation,” according to the defence ministry in a post on the Telegram messaging app. Russia’s defence ministry stated that the exercises were to test whether units were fully prepared to use non-strategic nuclear weapons — such as short-range missiles or torpedoes — “to respond and in order to unconditionally ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian State.”
Nuclear Sharing Arrangements
NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, and Russia’s deployment of non-strategic nuclear forces in Belarus under Russian command, raise questions regarding compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The NPT is near universally recognized as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, while promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT “recognizes” five nuclear-armed States (China, France, Russia, UK, and US) and prohibits other States parties from acquiring nuclear weapons.
During the Cold War, both the US and the USSR deployed hundreds of nuclear weapons in their respective allied countries in Western and Eastern Europe. The USSR maintained sole central command and control of its nuclear weapons stationed in Warsaw Treaty Organization member States.
In contrast, NATO’s nuclear sharing involves the US stationing nuclear weapons in five allied countries in Europe and allows and involves them in planning and potential use of these weapons in a crisis. As noted above, the air forces of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey deploy dual-capable aircraft equipped and certified to carry nuclear weapons, and to launch them against adversary targets under joint control: both US and the host State.
Proponents argue that nuclear sharing does not violate the NPT, as it is consistent with the Treaty’s provisions. They contend that this does not result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons since the host countries do not possess their own nuclear arsenals; the weapons remain under US control.
Critics, including this author, counter argue that the arrangement undermines the NPT’s goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, as it effectively gives non-nuclear States access to nuclear capabilities and complicate disarmament efforts.
The legality of NATO’s nuclear sharing continues to be debated among legal scholars, diplomats, and policy analysts, reflecting differing interpretations of the NPT and implications for nuclear disarmament, deterrence and security; as well as the complex relationship between security arrangements and nuclear disarmament efforts in the current geopolitical landscape.
In the context of the NPT review process, the non-aligned (NAM) countries which comprise the majority of NPT States parties have never accepted the “integration” or legality of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. And, they also have criticized Russia’s return to deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus.
From High Noon to Steadfast Noon
Since the Steadfast Noon nuclear war planning exercise involves non-nuclear-weapon States’ hosting of US nuclear weapons, it remains controversial and heightens risks of accidental or inadvertent nuclear conflict with Russia.
I would not be surprised if in 2003 when the exercise was first conducted, some imaginative NATO nuclear war planner envisaged a potential connection between the film High Noon and Steadfast Noon in the context of themes of confrontation, responsibility, and the moral dilemmas faced in high-stakes situations.
High Noon, staring Grace Kelly and Gary Cooper, was released in 1952 and won four Academy Awards (Oscars). In the film, the protagonist, Marshall Will Kane, played by Gary Cooper, faces a looming threat and must confront it head-on, despite the odds and the opposition of his wife Amy Fowler Kane.
Steadfast Noon purports to prepare to counter potential nuclear threats, emphasizing readiness to confront geopolitical tensions.
In the film, Marshal Kane takes on the responsibility to defend his town, even when others abandon him. This might have been taken to mirror NATO’s commitment to collective defence, where member States have a shared responsibility to respond to threats against their security—but it is the United States (marshal) that wields the nuclear baton.
The film explores the ethical decisions involved in facing a violent threat. Likewise, Steadfast Noon raises questions about nuclear deterrence and the moral implications of nuclear war preparations, especially in the context of global peace and stability.
The moral of High Noon centers around the themes of courage, integrity, and the importance of standing up for what is right, even when faced with overwhelming odds. Does Steadfast Noon meet the same moral standard as High Noon, given that the exercise is specifically aimed at ensuring nuclear deterrence for a few, while increasing nuclear dangers for the rest of the world – the reader must make that determination according to their moral compass and conscience.
*Personal comments by Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a former Member of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament (EPG) established by the Foreign Minister of Japan.