By Nigel Chamberlain and Ian Davis, NATO Watch
The assumed problem – increasing threat from missile attack from North Korea, Iran or any other rogue state or non-state actors.
The proposed solution – build a web of connected radar and communication centres so that various missiles can be launched to intercept them.
The cost (financial) - €1.25 billion to 2020, and rising, to European taxpayers collectively, plus large contributions to the development of national systems.
The cost (geo-political) – further degradation of relations with Russia which feels threatened by missile deployment encroachment which it views as an extension of NATO enlargement.
Background
“NATO missile defence capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.” Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010.
NATO established a need for an interim Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence capability in 2010 followed by an Interim Territorial Defence capability in 2012. The Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme is part of the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). The ALTBMD Programme Office became the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Office (NATO BMD PO).
On 28 October 2013 NATO Deputy Secretary General Vershbow participated in a ground-breaking ceremony of the missile defence facility at the Deveselu Airbase near Caracal in southern Romania saying that the facility would be an important part of NATO’s overall missile defences in Europe.
During his trip to Poland in early November, US Secretary of State John Kerry’s discussed the basing of interceptor missiles at Poland’s air base in Redzikowo which should be operational by 2018. Poland is expected to sign anti-missile systems contracts in January according to Marty Coyne, Business Development Director for Medium Extended Air Defence Systems (MEADS) International.
Building the shield
In an article titled 'Building the Shield' on 26 November, Defense News reported that in addition to NATO's collective effort European countries are aiming to bolster their own missile defence capabilities under the MEADS initiative.
On 30 November, Philippe Clar, Director of Defence programmes at the European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) Companysaid that other European companies were working with Raytheon to bid for NATO BMD contracts. The project team, called Perseus, would be led by Astrium with Cassidian (the defence and security division of the EADS group), IABG of Germany, Thales of France and TNO of the Netherlands also participating.
Defense News added that Perseus, formerly a Greek god but co-opted for 'Partners for Experienced Support from Europe and the US', will face “stiff competition, with US heavyweights such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin widely expected to compete”. When asked what makes the programme important, Clar said: “It’s a business opportunity. Missile defence is a strategic programme, very important for European industry.” A NATO decision on which company or group of companies will be awarded the contract is expected in approximately three months.
According to UPIon 9 December, Astrium, an aerospace subsidiary of EADS based in France, has signed a transatlantic agreement with Raytheon to compete for contract work on NATO's Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme. George Mavko, Raytheon Missile Systems' Director of European Missile Defence said:
With more than 30 years' experience in ballistic missiles development and production, ballistic battle analysis, and threat modelling, Astrium is a leader in European missile defence. Combined with Raytheon's decades of experience in ballistic missile defence interceptors, radars and space sensors, this partnership will provide Europe the best, most affordable missile defence protection.
Financial costs
NATO has spent €250 million on theatre missile defence since 2006 on command and control systems. Estimated costs to the end of the decade are €550 million, plus €200 million to expand it to cover NATO’s European populations, territory and forces. All costs are to be divided between the 28 Allies with Germany hosting the command and control structure for NATO BMD at Alliance Headquarters Air Command Ramstein. Developments at Deveselu Airbase, expected to be operational in 2015, are likely to cost NATO Member States $134 million (€100 million).
On 25 September, Defense News reported that the NCIA had informed the defence industry of the opportunities to bid for missile defence systems engineering and testing contracts worth more than €1 billion (US $1.35 billion). The initial contract that NATO has called for bids will have a seven-year period of performance and an estimated value of US $91 million (€66 million).
In terms of national contributions to the overall US and European effort to build a missile shield, Poland's plans to modernise its anti-aircraft and anti-missile system by 2022 is estimated to be worth as much as 26.4 billion zloty (US $8.4 billion or €6.1 billion), making it the country’s largest armament programme. US Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Poland in early November was related to Poland’s military modernisation programme and potential arms acquisitions.
Impact on NATO-Russian relations
Referring to an article 'NATO Missile Defence Is No Threat to Russia' in the Moscow Times on 13 November by NATO Deputy Secretary General Vershbow, Vladim Kozin questioned how defensive units can distinguish between short, medium and long range missiles at very short notice. While accepting that the US has cancelled Phase 4 of the European missile defence system, he points out that Washington has not stopped research and development on these advanced interceptors, “which means that they could be deployed in Europe in the future”.
Kozin, head of a group of advisors to the Director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, added that after 12 years of negotiations there are no legal checks and balances “to contain the looming missile defence arms race between the two largest nuclear powers”.
NATO has repeatedly said that it intended to proceed with the missile defence plans for Europe, regardless of Russian protestation. In concluding his Moscow Times article, Vershbow again offered to cooperate with Russia in building a missile defence architecture that would protect both NATO and Russia from the “growing ballistic missile threat from rogue countries” … and that “by working together, we could overcome the mistrust and suspicion that still surround this issue”.
Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov agreed that "Russia-NATO cooperation prospects are huge. We would have made very serious progress in international security if the other side had demonstrated political will," adding that “missile defence in Europe remains a key problem in Russia-NATO relations”. And in his annual address to Russia's Federal Assembly on 12 December, President Putin said: "We are perfectly aware that missile defence systems are defensive only in name. In fact, this is a significant component of a strategic offensive potential.”
Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov agreed that "Russia-NATO cooperation prospects are huge. We would have made very serious progress in international security if the other side had demonstrated political will," adding that “missile defence in Europe remains a key problem in Russia-NATO relations”. And in his annual address to Russia's Federal Assembly on 12 December, President Putin said: "We are perfectly aware that missile defence systems are defensive only in name. In fact, this is a significant component of a strategic offensive potential.”
NATO Watch comment
Missile defence is an incredibly complicated subject in its planning, funding and implementation – if not in its rational, which seems to be questionable and contentious. The breakdown of what is ostensibly a US, NATO or national asset is opaque and, as a consequence, so is a clear understanding of relative and assigned costs. But what is clear is that costs, both fiscal and geopolitical, are going to be substantial and on-going for some time. That alone should be of concern to national treasuries, parliamentary oversight bodies and citizens in NATO Member States. There is a sense of inevitable and growing momentum behind this endeavour with a good deal of industrial commitment already entrenched and with the prospect of lucrative contracts on the horizon.
Most worryingly, however, is the seemingly negative impact this highly controversial military procurement programme is having on NATO-Russia relationsand the absence of any ‘circuit breakers’ to reflect changes in geopolitics (such as the emerging détente with Iran) .
Generally, we are led to believe that NATO is seeking to channel European defence spending towards essential military programmes which enhance collective security within the Alliance. Based on this ‘smart defence’criteria, it is hard not to conclude that the inextricable drive for missile defence systems in Europe is heading in the opposite direction and ignoring all indicators that do not coincide with established thinking inside the Pentagon and NATO HQ.