



NATO Enlargement – It's not all over, yet

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Introduction

NATO has added new members six times since its founding in 1949. Three enlargements took place during the Cold War (Greece and Turkey in 1952; West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982) and three after the Cold War ended (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined in 1999, amid much debate within the organisation and Russian opposition; seven Central and Eastern European countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania joined in 2004 after membership talks were initiated during the 2002 Prague summit; and Albania and Croatia joined in 2009).

Future NATO membership is a topic of debate in many countries. Cyprus and Macedonia are prevented from accession by, respectively, Turkey and Greece, pending the resolution of disputes between them. Other countries which have a stated goal of eventually joining include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Georgia. The incorporation of former Warsaw Pact countries has been a cause of increased tension between NATO and Russia, culminating in the current crisis in Ukraine. Ukraine's relationship with NATO has been particularly divisive, and is part of a larger debate between Ukraine's political and cultural ties to both Europe and Russia.

At a panel discussion with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and former NATO Secretaries General Lord Robertson and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the [Brussels Forum](#) on 21 March a question was asked as to whether NATO's post-Cold War enlargements broke a promise to Russia. Lord Robertson, who oversaw

the first two of those enlargements, responded by saying quite categorically that NATO didn't break its promise on enlargement. (The panel discussion is summarised as an appendix to this briefing paper). Similarly, in a recent [fact sheet](#) that "sets the record straight" on Russian attempts "to divert attention away from its aggression against Ukraine", NATO refutes Russian claims that NATO promised not to enlarge. "No such pledge was made, and no evidence to back up Russia's claims has ever been produced", the alliance says.

Nonetheless, NATO enlargement remains a divisive issue across the political spectrum in both East and West. In this briefing paper, we review recent arguments that represent the two main camps: one that defends NATO's existing expansion policy and argues for further enlargement, subject to candidate countries satisfying the membership criteria; and the other that questions the value of enlargement and urges caution in any future application of NATO's 'open door' policy.

The 'forging ahead' camp

During his speech at the conference on enlargement in Vilnius, Estonia on 3 April [Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Vershbow](#) said that "we have every reason to celebrate, because NATO's open door policy has been a great success" and it "has helped to erase many of the painful Cold War dividing lines on our continent".

He added that NATO enlargement had also been good for Russia and refuted the argument that NATO's enlargement policy was deliberately

designed to weaken Russia, and to 'encircle' it. He said: "The reality is that we have gone out of our way to reach out to Russia, and to reassure Russia." Explaining his position, Versbow indicated that NATO would remain open to new membership to extend stability, democracy and the rule of law and that the NATO Summit in Wales in September will be "an important opportunity to demonstrate that determination". Concluding his speech, he stated:

Let me say to you, to our Russian friends and their hyperactive propaganda machine: NATO enlargement has not exhausted itself. It has been a resounding success, it has made Europe -- including Russia -- more secure, and it remains a central pillar of NATO's future.

In his article 'The right to choose' on 1 April, [Secretary General Rasmussen](#) said that "2014 marks a number of significant anniversaries for the Euro-Atlantic family of nations". He said that the accessions to NATO and the EU are "one of the great success stories of our time" but "the task is not yet done" as there are still countries which wish to join the Euro-Atlantic organisations". Rasmussen stated that Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia and Montenegro "all aspire to join the Alliance".

And NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, [Jamie Shea](#), is another big advocate of enlargement. He "completely refute[s] the notion that there is any link between NATO enlargement and the crisis in Crimea" adding that "enlargement is a convenient excuse which can be used to justify unreasonable activities". Shea insists that NATO enlargement shouldn't have been handled any differently.

Former Deputy National Security Advisor to US Vice President Joe Biden, [Julianne Smith](#), said: "I'm a strong supporter of NATO enlargement. We have brought many countries back into their natural home as being members of European and transatlantic institutions." Speaking after a summit with EU leaders in Brussels, and prior to the NATO Defence Ministers meeting at the beginning of April, [President Obama](#) said that there should be "a regular NATO presence" in states that feel vulnerable to Russian pressure but added that neither Ukraine nor Georgia was

on a path to NATO membership and "there were no **immediate** [*emphasis added*] plans for expansion of NATO's membership".

President Obama also indicated that the United States would use the Ukraine crisis to step up pressure on European allies to contribute more to the cost of their own defence, stating: "I have had some concerns about a diminished level of defence spending among some of our partners in NATO." This understanding was reinforced by the [Secretary General's](#) article in *The Telegraph* on 6 April when he stated: "Today's crisis shows that defence matters as much as ever. So every ally needs to invest the necessary resources in the right capabilities."

[Denis Staughton](#) wrote in *The Irish Times* that some of the biggest defence contractors in the US recently attended a fundraiser for a top Republican Congressman and Committee Chairman. The mood, partly set by the crisis in Ukraine, was "borderline euphoric", according to one attendee. The implication being that NATO-Russian confrontation would provide a resurgence in demand for military equipment.

And, finally, the 'forging ahead camp' position was encapsulated in a [statement by the North Atlantic Council](#) on 1 April celebrating the enlargement anniversaries. NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed that, "in accordance with our policy, the Alliance's door remains open to new members in the future".

The 'urging more caution' camp

Writing in *The National Interest*, [Henrik Larsen](#) from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government called for "a higher level of sophistication in dealing with Russia" which he suggests "should not be rocket science, given Russia's many warnings against growing Western influence in East European politics over the past years". He points out that Russia has launched several initiatives to redefine Europe's security architecture to halt NATO and EU expansions and suggests that the Ukrainian crisis highlights the absence of strategic thinking in the way both Americans and Europeans conduct foreign policy.

He adds that NATO's pledge to keep the door open to Ukraine membership and the Western

decision to rush to a swift recognition of the Ukrainian interim government could only reinforce Russian perceptions that NATO intended to extend its influence right up to the border and points out that “NATO cannot ignore Russia’s opinion in its attempt to cultivate cooperative security relations throughout Eastern Europe”.

Larsen advocates the avoidance of bombastic rhetoric about ‘enhanced partnership’ “because it in reality can offer little more than symbolic embraces” and for NATO “to unwind further enlargement pledges eastward as delicately as possible (both Ukraine and Georgia)”. He suggests that the Ukraine crises “is also a wake-up call for how strategy can be optimized by trying to see oneself through the eyes of the adversary” and concludes that: “It is time to strike a deal based on a NATO pledge of non-enlargement in return for a Russian pledge not to interfere militarily further into Eastern Europe”.

Taking a similar line to Larsen, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, [Stefan Meister](#), says: “The NATO enlargement meant for Russia that it’s lost influence in the region. This explains the feeling of insecurity in Russia, of NATO coming closer”. He believes that the Russian perception of an ever-growing NATO is also one of the key factors that caused the Crimean crisis and that it is crucial that NATO listens more closely to the signals the Russian leadership is sending.

Writing in *The American Conservative*, [Scott McConnell](#) suggests that “a rapidly congealing Beltway consensus seems to be forming around the idea of a new Cold War”. He argues that the events in the Ukraine sparked a predictable Russian countermove, and in cascading fashion, “this has descended upon an American political establishment that has responded as if it had been subconsciously yearning for a ‘bipartisan’ and ‘unifying’ mission of the sort the Cold War once provided”.

His analysis is that neo-conservative commentators have the initiative in the opinion columns and that their proposals for tough measures against Russia are being taken up by liberals too. Public opinion is being formed and led, as it was in the build-up to the war in Iraq. The Ukraine crisis is a subset of the larger

question about Russia and NATO expansion at the end of the Cold War which was debated in the mid 1990s in forums largely limited to foreign policy specialists. McConnell believes that, if the Ukraine crisis leads to war, “it will be clear that decisions taken quietly in the 1990s lit the fuse”. The end of the Soviet Union came relatively peacefully. McConnell suggests that a major reason for this was:

The understanding, explicit according to some but never formally codified, that the West would not take strategic advantage of Moscow’s retreat. Had Moscow envisioned that the West would expand NATO to its doorstep, the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union would probably not have expired peacefully.

The foundations of the expansionist victory, according to the author, had four piers:

1. The forces of bureaucratic inertia—NATO has many layers of vested constituencies, which needed new rationales to justify their salaries and continued existence.
2. Domestic American politics—Clinton in 1996 made his initial NATO-expansion speeches at campaign events crafted to appeal to Polish and East European voters.
3. The desire of traditional hawks, neoconservative and others, to continue a version of the Cold War, perhaps by sparking a ‘democratic crusade’ in Eastern Europe.
4. The moral case—we would finally ‘do right’ by those East Europeans twice abandoned—so the conventional narrative ran—first at Munich and then again at Yalta.

And finally, the ‘urging more caution’ camp is perhaps best represented by two warnings from 1997. The American strategist [George Kennan](#), who designed the ‘doctrine of containment’ in the early Cold War, wrote in a *New York Times* op-ed that expanding NATO would be “the most fateful error” of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Britain’s former Ambassador to Moscow, [Rodric Braithwaite](#), wrote in *Prospect* that a defeated enemy is best drawn into the ‘concert of Europe’ rather than humiliated.

Seemingly, the United States initially followed the former path then deviated to the latter.

NATO Watch Comment

It is interesting to reflect on the selection of appropriate wording for the differing opinions and advisability of *extending* NATO membership to countries formerly bordering, or actually *incorporated* by, the Soviet Union. Some say *enlargement*, some say *expansion*, with the former perhaps implying a more benign process and the latter perhaps implying a more aggressive process. Either way, it is hard not to conclude that it has been progressively corrosive of NATO-Russian relations, whether intended, or not. The claim that the crisis in Ukraine is entirely unrelated to the decision to bring more countries into the NATO fold is hardly credible. And it is hard to see just how the countries of Western Europe and North America (the original members of NATO) have become more secure at the expense of aggravating the 'other side' in the Cold War who had already thrown in the towel and then found a reason and justification to reassert itself militarily.

We find very little to disagree with and an awful lot to agree with in Scott McConnell's article '[NATO's Wrong Turn](#)' in *The American Conservative*. His opening sentence is a classic statement about how public opinion is created and then led, almost always with a clear objective in mind. And it is a reminder that anyone who questions received wisdom from an elite conglomerate can't necessarily be dismissed as a troublesome liberal or as someone giving comfort to the generally accepted aggrieving party. In other words, the suggestion that the current crisis in Ukraine is partly the outcome of the rush to incorporate those countries released from the orbit of the Soviet Union into the orbit of the United States of America, and its allies, might have some validity once perceived in its historical context. And, putting the boot on the other foot, making such an unpopular suggestion must not automatically be perceived as supporting Russia's annexation of Crimea and moving military forces to the Ukraine border. Reality is always more complex than can be expressed in sound bites to fit rolling news demands and adversarial commentary is usually more to do with point

scoring and 'visibility' than it is to do with enlightening the observer.

Judging by what we have been witnessing and listening to from inside the NATO hierarchy, it seems highly unlikely that we will see what Henrik Larsen called 'a higher level of sophistication in dealing with Russia'. No leading spokesperson has shown the slightest inclination to be moved by what he calls 'a wake-up call' which should encourage a strategy rethink "by trying to see oneself through the eyes of the adversary".

The Secretary General's repeated appeals to spend more on collective defence have finally gained traction in a largely unreceptive electorate. The work to encourage national treasuries to release more funds into the hands of those who produce armaments is becoming increasingly effective, much to the delight of the defence contractors. And the club of national Foreign Ministers who attended the recent Brussels jamboree, declared, seemingly without any reference to their national parliaments, that 'it's not all over, yet' – seemingly regardless of how such insensitivity is perceived in Moscow, how it might encourage escalation of rhetoric and how it might contribute to 'lighting the fuse' of confrontation.

Appendix: Summary of the panel discussion at the '[Brussels Forum](#)' on 21 March 2014

Organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and former NATO Secretaries General Lord Robertson and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

Key points:

- NATO didn't break its promise on enlargement
- There may have been limitations on Georgia and Ukraine
- Global engagement wasn't a mistake
- Crimea is a fait accompli

- It's time to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets
- Ukraine demonstrates a comprehensive Russian strategy
- Russia is not trying to revive the Cold War
- Continue talking at the NATO-Russian Council
- NATO's 'Open Door' policy has not been closed
- Critical capability shortfalls must be addressed
- The EU and NATO must work more co-operatively
- NATO must have a high profile leader

Constanze Stlezenmuller (Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States): Did NATO break its promise to Russia in 1999 not to engage in enlargement by taking up all the new Eastern European members? The quote that is often heard is the one by James Baker that NATO would not move an inch nearer to Russia's borders.

Lord George Robertson: (Senior Counsellor, The Cohen Group): No, it didn't. The enlargement of 2002 broke no promises at all and, indeed, was done with the cooperation of Russia. I had many meetings with Russians at that time, and although there were some members of the government of Russia who were reluctant, especially about the Baltic States, ultimately President Putin stood back and said that he was quite comfortable with that taking place. I think there were other sorts of limitations that may have related to Georgia and to Ukraine in particular. We said there would be no permanent forward postings of NATO troops. And I think the previous promise had to do with the stationary of nuclear forces to the east as well.

Constanze Stlezenmuller: Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, you presided over much of NATO's initial Afghan operations and over a NATO that was going global with a vengeance, that was looking to become more deployable, more sustainable, more globally engaged itself and with partners. Given what is happening now and with limited defence budgets at a time of crisis, was that a mistake?

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Professor, Leiden University): No, it definitely wasn't. But Vladimir Putin has helped us in two ways. Firstly to

underline the relevance of NATO and, secondly, because he might convince politicians in the Allied nations to stop the slide in defence budgets. That's a silver lining of this. What we now have to do is see that we bring political comfort to the Baltics, to Poland, to the central and European states, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. That will mean a lot of money. That's not, of course, NATO's responsibility. That's where the European Union comes in. It is good to have good relations with global partners but we have been taught a power politics lesson by Mr. Putin. NATO as well as the European Union should now do everything it can to prevent this crisis from worsening. And I hate to admit it, but Crimea is a *fait accompli*. It took me close to two years to get consensus on air policing over the Baltics. That wasn't necessary. It took much longer to develop contingency plans for that region. They didn't exist, and it was considered too provocative. We know better now.

Constanze Stlezenmuller: You said this situation is a potential game-changer. We must stand together now to protect our way of life. That said, how serious are NATO's defence commitments towards Eastern Europe, given the U.S. drawdown and European defence cuts?

Secretary General Rasmussen: We will take all necessary steps and measures to ensure effective protection and defence of our Allies. I think this is a wake-up call and in all European capitals, the whole situation should now be reviewed and it is necessary to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets. We can't continue cutting deeply in defence budgets and still think that we are able to provide effective collective defence. That's the reality.

Anne-Marie Slaughter (Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University): The consensus here seems to be this is just absolutely a game-changer. You know, Kosovo would have looked not so dissimilar from the Russian point of view, in the sense that once you separated Kosovo from Serbia, you got a popular result that looked very different than what a referendum in Serbia and Kosovo as a whole would have produced. And what happened in Georgia was very similar. Why is there such a consensus that suddenly the world has changed?

Secretary General Rasmussen: There is a huge difference between Kosovo and what we are witnessing in Crimea. Let me just remind you that in Kosovo we were pretty close to what I would consider genocide. And finally, too late but finally, the international community took action. And since then, our actions have been based on a UN Security Council resolution.

Constanze Stlezenmuller: But I don't think that's what Anne-Marie Slaughter in all fairness was doing. She was asking: Why didn't we think that was a watershed moment already? And why didn't we think Georgia was already a watershed moment?

Secretary General Rasmussen: What we witnessed in Georgia was also a very serious challenge. Of course, there are similarities between what we saw in Georgia and what we are now witnessing in Ukraine, but the two events together really demonstrate that this is part of a more comprehensive Russian strategy.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: I do agree with Anders. What happened in 2008 in this regard is not basically different. The consequences could be very, very different because Ukraine is not Georgia. And that is what I see as a big risk. And that is the reason that we have to prevent Putin raising the temperature in the eastern and southern part of Ukraine.

Lord George Robertson: You know, the fact that you intervene in some place doesn't mean you have to intervene in every place. These are all very different and they can be very complicated situations, but there is no doubt about the geopolitical importance of Ukraine today.

Orysia Lutsevych (Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House): Dr. Scheffer, when President Yushchenko was in Brussels this week, he said he had very bitter memories of the Bucharest summit during which a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and for Georgia was declined due to public support being too low at 31% in favour of NATO membership. He reminded us that when Spain was joining NATO, public opinion was even lower. Do you agree with him that had these two countries had Membership Action Plans, the situation today would not have occurred?

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: Bucharest was a pressure cooker because there were major differences within the alliance between France and Germany on the one hand, United States on the other hand, partly a reflection of difference over Iraq. The political basis for bringing them in was simply not there. It wasn't there in Bucharest and it is not here now. We know they aren't going to be NATO members in the next few years. Had they been NATO members, we would have of course been obliged, as we are now in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and elsewhere, to enact Article 5.

Alexander Grushko (Russian Ambassador to NATO): I do believe that NATO is very close to having a new or old *raison d'être* in reviving talk of a Cold War. This is not the position of the Russian Federation and we do believe that we have a global security agenda which is extremely important and Russia will be prepared to continue cooperation, but on an equal footing. It should be acknowledged that the policy of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, when he came to power was in fact to build strategic partnership. The signing of the Rome Declaration was the result of our common vision on how to build a security architecture after 2001. We also proposed to launch a project called Four Common Spaces with the European Union. We don't need permission from NATO to act in line with international law. Crimea was absolutely a legitimate case. NATO should acknowledge that fact and since NATO is a club of democratic countries, should accept this democratic choice of Crimean people. Today there is a lot of debate about a new vision of NATO, that NATO should be in a position to demonstrate its muscles. And a lot has been said about the vulnerability of the Baltic States. There are 640,000 people who are not recognised as citizens there because they speak Russian. It will be the better solution to recognise this than to send US interceptors there with a very unclear mission.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: All of us, including Russia in 1999, subscribed to the principle that each and every nation has an inherent right to freely choose its alliances. Why doesn't the Russian Federation respect that principle to which it has subscribed?

Alexander Grushko: The basic principles of international law enshrined in all the documents

state the indivisibility of security, that nobody will improve its security at the expense of the security of others. NATO and Russia are free to take any decision to protect its legitimate security interests. From the beginning we stated that if NATO goes with enlargement it will continue to produce new dividing lines moving towards Russian borders, sometimes inside countries. This was a very important signal which affects security architecture and was behind our proposal for a new treaty on European security.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: Will you accept Georgia's rights to choose NATO membership if this is a Georgian decision?

Alexander Grushko: No. We're against. We believe that this would be a huge mistake.

Ambassador Masafumi Ishii (Ambassador from Japan): The Secretary General has eloquently stated that the core issue here is that unilateral change of the status quo by force should not be tolerated and the rule of the law should prevail. This is a global issue, not just a regional one.

Markus Tratos (ph): Russia was playing an important role in Syria on the chemical weapons front. What will happen now?

Secretary General Rasmussen: All parties involved should feel obliged to live up to the United Nations Security Council resolution on the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. That should not be affected by ongoing events in Ukraine.

Unidentified speaker: I think invading Georgia as well as Crimea were not easy decisions for President Putin because actually his world view tends to be fairly legalistic. Russia's invasion of Georgia was militarily clumsy but they had tried to really create a kind of moral case for invasion. In Crimea, it was militarily swift and smooth but they didn't care whether the pretext for invasion was believable. They challenged the rules. If the principle of free choice of alliance is being challenged, we don't want to intellectually rephrase it. But we are in no position to enforce it either. How do we go about it?

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: We go about it not primarily in the military domain because we can't. What Putin in my opinion is doing is giving his answer, perhaps a bit belatedly, on the NATO

and EU enlargement in the sense that you have come closer, too close, to my borders. He is going to create a protective ring of nations where he wants influence. He knows that Ukraine, because it's too big, that he cannot have exclusive influence.

Lord George Robertson: I hope that Russia will be called to Brussels to hear what other people think of what is going on, and to perhaps explain and for a collective examination of what the future might be because it's very important that we don't simply focus on this particular issue. We need to look at the ramifications elsewhere. Russia needs to work out where it is going if it's not going to find itself in isolation. This is primarily going to be a matter for diplomacy in the United Nations and especially in the EU as the Ukrainian economy is in dire trouble.

Damon Wilson (Atlantic Council): We've debated whether NATO enlargement played a role in Georgia and the Ukraine. But what is the future of the NATO enlargement? What's actually the future of the EU enlargement as part of our strategic response?

Secretary General Rasmussen: We should of course address the open-door policy convincingly at the Summit in September. We will update assessments of each of the four aspirant countries: Georgia, Montenegro, the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO Foreign ministers will discuss this and take decisions when they meet by the end of June. We need to speak a language that is understood in the Kremlin. That means determination, that means western unity and it means giving a realistic Euro-Atlantic perspective to countries that so wish.

Lord George Robertson: We need to look at a broader canvas about how the Europeans especially are going to organise their defence and security affairs, if they care. America is now in the business of participating but not in leading. And that means that the Europeans have to recognise their own fate is in their own hands. Maybe we need to think a bit more ambitiously about a different framework, but one that still has the intrinsic strength that NATO has brought over its 65 years.

Gita Beck (former Defence Minister for Denmark): I would like to address the issues

about increased spending in the European-NATO countries. Mr. Rasmussen, do you prefer to have the European countries to increase their defence spending but not being able to deploy their soldiers, or do we prefer to have the defence spending as it is right now but have all the European countries to be able to deploy their soldiers?

Secretary General Rasmussen: It's not either-or. You could do both. But of course you point to an important element in this. It's not just a question about how much you spend but also how you spend. That's why I think our focus should be on the development of modern capabilities and flexibility and deployability. And that's actually how we are going to address this issue at the summit in September. As an outcome of the NATO defence planning process, we have identified a number of critical shortfalls and we will now focus on these shortfalls to try to prioritize because we can't do everything. In some countries we have seen cuts up to 40 per cent. It's much, too much and we have to reverse that trend. Recent EU commitments on capabilities are a positive sign.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: I do hope that the EU will also be in close consultation with NATO, but we all know how difficult that this relationship has been. There's an EU-NATO collective responsibility in my opinion, more specifically as there might be crises where the US would not be directly and immediately involved.

Lord George Robertson: My advice for Mr Rasmussen's successor is not to move NATO back to being an organization purely based on territorial defence. There are real challenges in the cyber world, in climate security and resource wars and global terrorism and extremism and nationalism that are all coming along. These have got to be on the priority area for NATO, both in capability terms but also in its politics. And the Republic of Macedonia should be allowed to join the alliance.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: Whatever decisions are taken, more money and a greater political will are necessary, based on a closer NATO-EU relationship. NATO will not succeed without the EU succeeding and I agree NATO can't just focus territorial defence.

Secretary General Rasmussen: I think it's of utmost importance that NATO has a high profile leader and not least taking into account recent events, I think determination, clear action-oriented approach are essential for the leadership of NATO. I would say the most important task is to fight retrenchment. Retrenchment leaves behind a security vacuum. And that vacuum will be filled by autocrats that will try to test us. My plea is that my successor will focus on keeping a global perspective when it comes to security and that's why I'm very much in agreement that I would also give high priority to number one defence of alliance territory. But let's remind ourselves that we can't effectively protect our populations and our territory unless we are also capable to go out-of-area if needed and defend against non-traditional threats and help non-NATO countries to defend themselves.

Constanze Stlezenmuller: Thank you. On that note, we know the next NATO Secretary General, whoever she is, will have a lot to do.

(Postscript: on the appointment of former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg as the next NATO Secretary General, see [A Dove Heads up Hawkish NATO](#), Ian Davis, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 9 April 2014).