Exit Strategies: The case for redefining NATO consensus on US Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Wilbert van der Zeijden, Susi Snyder and Peter Paul Ekker, IKV Pax Christi, April 2012

NATO is currently undergoing a Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR), which includes a discussion on the future of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. This latest report by IKV Pax Christi (see pdf attachment), elaborates on the reality that a large proportion of the Alliance does not explicitly favour the continued deployment of US nuclear bombs in Europe.

The IKV Pax Christi Withdrawal Issues report of 2011, found that a majority of NATO member state would prefer to see the US nuclear weapons removed from Europe, albeit under varying conditions. This new report reflects the fact that there is no consensus on keeping the weapons in Europe and reframes the debate with that in mind. Instead of defaulting to an old policy that can no longer count on agreement, the report suggests NATO recognize that a new consensus is emerging, one that requires a change in current nuclear deployments.

With the forthcoming DDPR, now is the time to ensure that the voices of allies who want a change in current peacetime basing practices are heard. To this end, we encourage you to read the attached report and seize any opportunity leading to the Chicago summit to advocate for a change in NATO nuclear deployment practices. In the countries hosting US nuclear weapons, we will specifically target parliaments to pass resolutions calling for a new consensus within NATO on the withdrawal of the redundant nuclear bombs. Similar messaging from political parties, parliament or government in your country would be a great contribution to breaking the non-consensual impasse in NATO on this issue.

Executive Summary

NATO does not have the authority to enforce continued nuclear deployments. Deployment, upkeep, security measures, the training of pilots, procurement of delivery platforms - formally, none of these decisions involve NATO.

In the past when non-strategic nuclear weapons were removed or nuclear support tasks were ended, NATO consensus was not a notable factor in the decision making. In fact, these were essentially bilateral decisions involving the U.S. and the host nation.

The U.S. can decide to end any deployment unilaterally. The host countries can decide to end their support for the infrastructure needed for deployment. Together, the U.S. and the host can decide to end deployment.

Past practice has led the alliance to strive for consensus- where all members do not block agreement. However, there is no known formal requirement for NATO to make decisions only by consensus. This is a political choice.

There is no consensus in NATO on continued deployment of U.S. B61 bombs in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. A majority of states, experts, NGO’s and populations regard the weapons as redundant militarily and of little significance politically. They want the weapons removed.

Ergo, host governments cannot hide behind NATO when they need to answer to their populations. If there are still U.S. nuclear weapons in these countries in the future, it is not because NATO prohibits removal. Like all things nuclear, in the end it all comes down to political will.

Recommendations

Host states that want to end the deployment of foreign nuclear weapons on their soil should make it clear to their NATO allies that there is no longer consensus support for the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, forcing NATO allies to work towards a new consensus.

Host states should make clear to the Alliance that if NATO again fails to address their concerns appropriately, host states retain the right to negotiate a plan for withdrawal outside of NATO. Decisions could be made shortly after the finalization of the DDPR and could be bilateral, or multilateral between the U.S. and any number of host states.

Parliaments in host countries should make sure that their ministers and heads of state are fully aware of their formal decision making powers. Understanding this complexity cannot be taken for granted, even among government officials and MFA/MOD staff.

The U.S. should reconsider the role of TNW as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Russia. Withdrawal to central locations in the U.S. would be a good start of negotiations, not a good outcome.

NATO should use the opportunity offered by the DDPR process to negotiate a consensus agreement on a time bound withdrawal of the B61s, reflecting the absence of full agreement to maintain a U.S. nuclear presence in Europe.

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Exit_Strategies_FINAL_1.pdf 1.09 MB